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"[T]he celebrated John Dickinson ... a man of
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good sense." - Historian Forrest McDonald,
describing Dickinson at the federal constitutional
convention. 1
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1. FORREST MCDONALD, E PLURIBUS UNUM 271-72 (2d ed., Liberty Press 1979)
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1. Introduction
The fact that John Dickinson refused to sign the Declaration of
Independence perhaps explains why he is less celebrated than many other
2Founders. The neglect is unjust. There is the point, after all, that
(1965).
2. Repeatedly Referenced Works: For convenience, this note collects alphabetically
by author or editor sources cited more than once in this Article. The editions and short
form citations used are as follows:
" FRANCIS BACON: BACON'S ESSAYS AND WISDOM OF THE ANCIENTS (1887)
[hereinafter BACON]
* BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1968)
" M.E. BRADFORD, A BETTER GUIDE THAN REASON: STUDIES IN THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1979) [hereinafter BRADFORD, REASON]
* M.E. BRADFORD, FOUNDING FATHERS: BRIEF LIVES OF THE FRAMERS OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2d ed., Univ. Press of Kan. 1994) (1982)
[hereinafter BRADFORD, FATHERS]
* EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION N FRANCE (1790),
available at http://www.constitution.org/eb/rev fran.htm (last visited Mar.
1, 2003) [hereinafter Burke]
* BURKE'S POLITICS (Ross J.S. Hoffman & Paul Levack eds., 1949)
[hereinafter BURKE'S POLITICS]
* A Pennsylvania Farmer at the Court of King George: John Dickinson's
London Letters, 1754-1756, 86 PA. MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 241, 417
(H. Trevor Colbourn ed., 1962) [hereinafter London Letters]
* H. TREVOR COLBOURN, THE LAMP OF EXPERIENCE: WHIG HISTORY AND THE
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (Liberty Fund
1998) (1965) [hereinafter Colbourn]
* John Dickinson, Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, in EMPIRE AND
NATION (Forrest McDonald ed., 1962) [hereinafter Farmer]
* John Dickinson, The Political Thought of John Dickinson, 39 DICK. L. REV.
1 (1934) (the author and namesake of his subject was then U.S. Assistant
Secretary of Commerce) [hereinafter Political Thought]
" JOHN DICKINSON, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN DICKINSON (Bonsal &
Niles 1801) (2 vols.) [hereinafter WRITINGS]
* JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (5 vols; 1941 ed. inserted
in 2 vols.) [hereinafter Elliot's Debates]
" THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed.,
1937) (4 vols.) [hereinafter FARRAND, RECORDS]
* MILTON E. FLOWER, JOHN DICKINSON: CONSERVATIVE REVOLUTIONARY
(1983) [hereinafter FLOWER]
* THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN DICKINSON 1764-1774 (Paul Leicester
Ford ed., Da Capo Press 1970) (1895) [hereinafter Ford]
* Elaine K. Ginsberg, John Dickinson, at http://www.anb.org/articles/01/01-
00218.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Ginsberg]
* James H. Hutson, John Dickinson at the Federal Constitutional Convention,
40 WM. & MARY Q. 256 (1983) [hereinafter Hutson]
" David L. Jacobson, John Dickinson and the Revolution in Pennsylvania, in
78 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLICATIONS IN HISTORY (1965)
[hereinafter Jacobson]
" Stanley Karl Johannesen, Constitution and Empire in the Life and Thought
of John Dickinson (1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
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Dickinson was no Tory. His refusal to sign was based on his perception
of America's best interests, and within a twinkling of time after Congress
made its decision, he was commanding troops in defense of his country.
More positively, however, is the point that by any objective
measure, John Dickinson was a leading figure in the founding
generation. Until supplanted by Jefferson and Paine, he was the
principal theorist for the colonial cause, well earning the sobriquet,
"Penman of the American Revolution." 3  He was one of the most
conspicuous members of the Continental Congress, was the primary
drafter of the Articles of Confederation, served as the President of "the
Delaware State" and as President of Pennsylvania, and-though the fact
is sometimes wrongly denied-was one of the most influential drafters of
the United States Constitution.
This Article explores Dickinson's contributions to the Constitution,
and finds them almost as great as any man's. Not quite at the level of
James Madison, George Washington, or Gouverneur Morris-but as near
as can be.
Missouri - Columbia) (on file with author) [hereinafter Johannesen]
" THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
(Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1976) (multiple vols. projected; not all
completed) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]
" JOHN LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT: SECOND TREATISE (Russell Kirk
intro., 1955) [hereinafter LOCKE]
" FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM (1985) (hereinafter
MCDONALD, Novus)
* Robert G. Natelson, The Enumerated Powers of States, 3 NEV. L.J. 469
(2003) [hereinafter Natelson, Enumerated]
" Robert G. Natelson, A Reminder: The Constitutional Values of Sympathy
and Independence, 91 KY. L.J. 353 (2003) [hereinafter Natelson,
Sympathy and Independence]
" Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An
Essay in Original Understanding, 51 U. KANSAS L. REV. (forthcoming
2003) [hereinafter Natelson, General Welfare Clause]
" J.H. Powell, John Dickinson and the Constitution, 60 PA. MAG. OF HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 1 (1936) [hereinafter Powell]
* CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, ROME, AND
THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT (1994) [hereinafter RICHARD]
* CHARLES J. STILLt, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JOHN DICKINSON (photo. reprint
1969) (1891) [hereinafter STILLE]
" JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO'S LETTERS (Ronald Hamowy
ed., 1995) (2 vols.) [hereinafter CATO]
" GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787
(1969) [hereinafter WOOD].
3. Professor H. Trevor Colbourn says that this common name for him came from
Moses Coit Tyler and, perhaps initially, from George Bancroft. London Letters, supra
note 2, at 243 n.3.
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II. A Brief Biography Through the Ratification Debates
4
John Dickinson was born on November 8, 1732 in Maryland. His
father, Samuel Dickinson, was a prosperous planter of tobacco, and later
wheat, and served as a lawyer and county court judge. Samuel's first
marriage produced nine children, most of whom, like their mother, died
unseasonably young. His second wife was Mary Cadwalader, and John
was their first child.
John may have helped provide his country with a vigorous
Constitution, but he certainly did not have one himself. Like his friend
and co-worker James Madison, he was troubled from youth with a
variety of ailments, and survived into old age only because of rigorous
attention to his health.5
In 1740, Samuel moved the family to Delaware-specifically to
Kent County, the middle county of Delaware's vertically-stacked three.
Primarily through private tutors, John received the usual education for
his day. As a young boy in Delaware, John studied not only the Greek
and Latin languages-the latter equipping one to pick up French, Italian,
or Spanish in a flash-but also classical works in subjects such as
history, poetry, literature, rhetoric, biography, philosophy, science, and
government.6 John's fondness for the classics would last all his life.7
Mathematics and other subjects supplemented this classical core.
By 1750, John decided he wanted to be a lawyer, and his father sent
him for training to the law office of John Moland in Philadelphia. He
4. The only complete modem biography of Dickinson is FLOWER, supra note 2. An
1891 biography, STILLt, supra note 2, is lacking in many respects, perhaps because the
author was a lawyer rather than a trained historian, but also because important Dickinson
documents were then unavailable.
The best extended treatment of Dickinson is Jacobson, supra note 2, but it covers
only twelve years, 1764 through 1776, and is limited to his political life.
The best shorter treatment is Ginsberg, supra note 2. See also BRADFORD,
FATHERS, supra note 2; H. Trevor Colbourn, Editorial Comments, in London Letters,
supra note 2.
The bibliographical information included in this Article draws from these
sources.
5. Even of the young man, Milton Flower says, "John Dickinson had never been
physically strong. Slight of frame, he was easy prey to pulmonary attacks." FLOWER,
supra note 2, at 14; see also 2 WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 168 (Fabius, Second Series,
Letter I) (noting his "infirmities"). Dickinson's letters to his parents from London,
written in his early twenties, devote considerable attention to fluctuations in his health.
See London Letters, supra note 2, at 245, 248-49, 256, 431.
6. RICHARD, supra note 2, at 12-38 (providing a general overview of the education
system in the founding generation).
7. For example, while in the engrossing business of studying law in London, he
took time to read Tacitus one winter. London Letters, supra note 2, at 453. His later
writings are replete with classical allusions. See infra text accompanying notes 17, 64,
262.
[Vol. 108:2
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was there for three years, but even that distinguished office8 was too
back-water a training ground for a young man of such promise. Thus, in
1753 his father shipped him off to London, where he studied for three
years at the Middle Temple. 9 In 1757, now nearly 25 years old, John was
admitted to the bar in London, and returned to America and entered
practice in Philadelphia. Through one of those prestidigital conditions
never quite made clear in biographies, Dickinson's success was almost
immediate. Besides being a bright young man and a hard worker, he
seems also to have had a magnetic presence, though his appearance was
like "a shadow-tall, but slender as a reed-pale as ashes."' 0 He was the
kind of man that people wanted to be around. People also wanted to pay
him for his work. Much of that work seems to have been litigation
involving decedents' estates and land claims of various kinds." He no
doubt practiced a good deal in the field of trusts-a point that would
become publicly significant later.
People not only wanted Dickinson to be their lawyer, they also
wanted him to be an elected official. Before John was 27, he won a seat
in the Delaware Assembly, was re-elected in 1760, and was then elected
Speaker. 12
In those days, Pennsylvania and Delaware were tied almost in
harness (they had a common governor), so a young man of Dickinson's
promise could hope for a political career in both states. After his early
success in Delaware, he chose to focus on the broader field of
Pennsylvania, winning a special election to fill a vacancy in the
Pennsylvania Assembly in 1762. He was re-elected in October, 1763
and in October, 1764. However, this was no vapid up-and-comer of the
kind that infest and depress democratic politics. Although he had
frequently been critical of the colony's proprietary charter with the Penn
family,' 3 when the issue arose as to whether to petition the King to
convert Pennsylvania's charter from a proprietary to a royal one,
8. FLOWER, supra note 2, at 10 ("John Moland ... was perhaps the most eminent
member of the [Pennsylvania] bar.").
9. Id. at 18-19.
10. Id. at 112 (quoting a Massachusetts delegate to the continental congress).
11. Id. at 24.
12. STILLE, supra note 2, at 37-38 (who omits his first election); Ginsberg, supra
note 2.
13. Jacobson, supra note 2, at 9, 12. Dickinson had been critical despite his pleasant
experiences with Thomas Penn while in London. See, e.g., London Letters, supra note 2,
at 264, 420. In one letter, he wrote to his mother:
Mr. Penn about a week ago sent for me to dine with him: I cannot conceive
how he got the dislike of the Philadelphians so much, for I never conversd [sic]
in all my life with a more agreable [sic], affable gentleman. He behavd [sic]
with a great deal of goodness and kindness towards me ....
Id. at 274.
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Dickinson firmly resisted the change. 14 He argued that the proprietary
charter, with all its faults, was better for Pennsylvanians than any royal
charter was likely to be.15 It was a sound argument, but it took time for
many to recognize its veracity. In opposing the petition, Dickinson was
bucking both public opinion and two of Pennsylvania's most powerful
figures: Joseph Galloway and the sainted (though not at all saintly)
Benjamin Franklin. Predictably, Dickinson overwhelmingly lost the vote
in the Assembly, and subsequently lost his seat in the Assembly)
6
Fortunately his elegant oration against the petition-reminiscent
somewhat, if more pale in force, of a speech by Edmund Burke-was
published and admired.17 The request to cashier the proprietary charter
got nowhere in London, and before long British actions gave
Pennsylvanians reason to be grateful it had not.
Dickinson was now out of office, but hardly out of public affairs. In
1765, he prepared the primary draft of the Pennsylvania Assembly's
resolutions against the Stamp Act. 18 He then served as a representative
to the Stamp Act Congress and composed its "Declaration of Rights."' 9
Later that year, he wrote his pamphlet on the Sugar Act: The Late
Regulations Respecting the British Colonies on the Continent ofAmerica
Considered.20  His greatest literary triumph came in 1767 and 1768,
when he published his twelve Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania-
pungent essays justifying colonial resistance to the Townshend Duties.2 '
They were an astounding success. The Farmer was toasted and praised
throughout the colonies.22  When it became known that the
"Pennsylvania Farmer" was actually a Delaware farmer practicing law in
Pennsylvania, no one took offense.23 Dickinson was feted as much as the
14. See Ford, supra note 2, at 21-49. For the text of his principal speech, see id.
15. See id.
16. In 1765 he decided not to run for re-election, recognizing that he would lose.
FLOWER, supra note 2, at 65, 68; Jacobson, supra note 2, at 30.
17. For the text of this speech, see Ford, supra note 2, at 21-49. Both Dickinson's
speech and those of Burke feature occasional quotations from the Latin classics. Id.
Speaking in Philadelphia, Dickinson felt the need immediately to explain or paraphrase
each quotation in English. Id. Speaking in London, Burke felt no such need.
18. Id. at 173.
19. See id at 183.
20. See id. at 211.
21. The letters are reproduced in Ford, supra note 2, at 305-406. A more recent
edition, to which I have cited in this Article, is included in EMPIRE AND NATION, supra
note 2.
The best discussion of the "Farmer" letters appears in Jacobson, supra note 2, at
43-69. See also.Johannesen, supra note 2, at 115-46.
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Farmer had been.24 His continental reputation was now secured. Also
secured was the heart of Mary Norris, a Philadelphia heiress whom the
long-time bachelor married in 1770. They had five children, but in
submission to the family bane of sickliness, three of them died in
infancy.
Dickinson apparently never had to campaign arduously for public
office. In October of 1770, Philadelphia electors took advantage of his
absence to send him again to the Pennsylvania Assembly. He served one
year, but did not run for re-election. The following year, he helped draft
a petition to the King asking for repeal of the tax on tea,25 but refused to
run for re-election to the legislature. In 1773, he composed two public
letters, also assailing the tax on tea.26
When the Boston Port Bill became law in the spring of -1774,
Dickinson, although firmly opposed to independence, became a central
political and literary figure in the colonial resistance. Among other
activities, he served as chairman of the Philadelphia Committee of
Correspondence; published four anonymous letters to the "Inhabitants of
the British Colonies; '27 and accepted election once again to the
Pennsylvania Assembly. The Assembly elected him to the Second
Continental Congress, where he served as chairman of the Committee of
Safety and Defense for Pennsylvania. In 1775, he rewrote for Congress
Thomas Jefferson's draft of the Declaration on the Causes and Necessity
of Taking up Arms.28 With respect to this Declaration and the ensuing
Olive Branch Petition, Jefferson's Autobiography relates Dickinson's
continued hope for reconciliation with Britain, and the esteem in which
his fellow delegates held him:
29
24. See id.
25. Reproduced in id. at 451.
26. Id. at 457-63.
27. Id. at 469-501.
28. The Jefferson, Dickinson, and final drafts can be found in 2 J. CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 128-157 (1775).
29. The musical play, 1776, portrayed quite a different personality for Dickinson
than his contemporaries attributed to him. See PETER STONE & SHERMAN EDWARDS,
1776: A MUSICAL PLAY (Penguin ed. 1976) (1970) [hereinafter 1776]. The play depicts
Dickinson in Congressional debate as: being nasty to John Adams, id. at 27-28, 39-40;
launching personal attacks, id. at 42; insulting Benjamin Franklin, id. at 40, and James
Wilson, id at 139; and making off-color jokes on the floor, id. at 41. Apart from the lack
of congruence with what we know of the man from sources such as Jefferson, whose
comments are immediately above in the text, we have the testimony of John Adams, who
had had a personal falling out with Dickinson, but nevertheless stated that he and
Dickinson "continued to debate in Congress upon all questions publickly [sic], with all
our usual Candor and good humour." JOHN ADAMS, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, available at
http://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/aea/cftn/doc.cfm?id=Al_19 (last visited Aug. 22,
2003).
Compounding the play's absurd representation of Dickinson is the authors'
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I prepared a draught of the Declaration committed to us. It was too
strong for Mr. Dickinson. He still retained the hope of reconciliation
with the mother country, and was unwilling it should be lessened by
offensive statements. He was so honest a man, & so able a one that
he was greatly indulged even by those who could not feel his
scruples. We therefore requested him to take the paper, and put it
into a form he could approve. He did so, preparing an entire new
statement, and preserving of the former only the last 4 paragraphs &
half of the preceding one. We approved & reported it to Congress,
who accepted it. Congress gave a signal proof of their indulgence to
Mr. Dickinson, and of their great desire not to go too fast for any
respectable part of our body, in permitting him to draw their second
petition to the King according to his own ideas, and passing it with
scarcely any amendment. The disgust against this humility was
general; and Mr. Dickinson's delight at its passage was the only
circumstance which reconciled them to it.30
Although the differences between Dickinson and Jefferson perhaps
have been exaggerated,31 it is true that throughout the entire period
leading up to the Declaration of Independence Dickinson was trying to
steer a middle course between submission and rebellion. 32  Dickinson
assurance in their "Historical Note" that "it really happen[ed] that way." 1776, supra, at
158. Their level of historical accuracy is further demonstrated by their statement that
Dickinson "left the Congress to enlist in the Continental Army as a private." Id. at 163.
Actually he held a colonel's commission in the militia at the time. See infra notes 43-46
and accompanying text.
30. THOMAS JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1821), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/jeffauto.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2003).
Jefferson added:
The vote being passed, altho' further observn [sic] on it was out of order,
[Dickinson] could not refrain from rising and expressing his satisfaction and
concluded by saying "there is but one word, Mr. President, in the paper which I
disapprove, & that is the word 'Congress,"' on which Ben Harrison rose and
said "there is but on word in the paper, Mr. President, of which I approve, and
that is the word 'Congress."'
Id.
31. Jacobson, supra note 2, at 97.
32. An excellent review of Dickinson's policies in Congress at that time is contained
in id. at 86-116.
According to John Adams, Dickinson was under pressure at home to oppose
independence. In his Autobiography, Adams wrote that in 1775:
Mr. Charles Thompson, who was then rather inclined [to] our Side of the
Question, told me, that the Quakers had intimidated Mr. Dickinsons [sic]
Mother, and his Wife, who were continually distressing him with their
remonstrances. His Mother said to him "Johnny you will be hanged, your
Estate will be forfeited and confiscated, you will leave your Excellent Wife a
Widow and your charming Children Orphans, Beggars and infamous." From
my Soul I pitied Mr. Dickinson. I made his case my own. If my Mother and
my Wife had expressed such Sentiments to me, I was certain, that if they did
not wholly unman me and make me an Apostate, they would make me the most
[Vol. 108:2
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was a firm believer in moderation-he once called it "a virtue, and the
parent of virtues., 33 Yet hotheads like John Adams interpreted him not
only as "very modest," but as "delicate, and timid. 34 In a private letter
intercepted by the British and made public, Adams characterized him as
representative of those of "great Fortune and piddling Genius."
35
On November 3, 1775, Pennsylvania credentialed Dickinson to the
Continental Congress for the ensuing year. 36 The Congressional Journals
for 1776 reveal him as active on numerous committees.37
On June 7, 1776, Richard Henry Lee announced in Congress his
famous resolution that "these United Colonies are and of right, ought to
be, free and independent States."3 8 The resolution also directed that "a
plan of confederation be prepared and transmitted to the respective
Colonies for their consideration and approbation. 3 9  On June 12,
Congress appointed Dickinson to chair the committee to prepare a draft
of that plan of confederation. 40 The draft, which survives, is in his
handwriting.4 1 These "Articles of Confederation" relied somewhat on an
miserable Man alive.
ADAMS, supra note 29.
33. Ford, supra note 2, at 271. See also the comments on Dickinson's moderation
by President Franklin Roosevelt's assistant commerce secretary, also named John
Dickinson. Political Thought, supra note 2, at 4 ("But it was not the ordinary kind of
moderation which avoids the taking of positions or the making of courageous decisions.
It was moderation simply in the sense of looking at all sides of a question and weighing
fairly and coolly the merits of all before coming to conclusions."). Cf Jacobson, supra
note 2, at 5 (quoting Dickinson's admiration for moderation in all things), 124
(describing him as a moderate in his methods). However, the later Dickinson's efforts to
claim the former for the New Deal were perhaps not as close to the mark. Political
Thought, supra note 2, at 7-9 (inaccurately resorting to the great Dickinson to support the
Roosevelt administration's constitutional theories).
34. JoHN ADAMS, DIARIES, Oct. 24, 1774, available at
http://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/aea/cfm/doc.cfm?id=A1_19 (last visited Mar. 18,
2003).
35. Jacobson, supra note 2, at 102.
36. 3 J. CONT. CONG. 327 (1775).
37. See generally vols. 4-6 J. CONT. CONG. (1776).
38. 5 J. CONT. CONG. 425 (1776). The resolution specifically provided:
Resolved, That these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and
independent States, that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British
Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great
Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved.
That it is expedient forthwith to take the most effectual measures for forming
foreign Alliances.
That a plan of confederation be prepared and transmitted to the respective
Colonies for their consideration and approbation.
Id.
39. Id.
40. See James Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787, reprinted in
3 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 539, 541.
41. See id.
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earlier proposal by Benjamin Franklin, and contemplated a looser union
than Franklin's, but a tighter one than that created by the finished
Articles.42
As for independence itself, Dickinson opposed it, arguing, among
other things, that the time was not yet ripe.43 Nevertheless, when it
became clear that the measure would pass, both Dickinson and
Pennsylvania's Robert Morris absented themselves to assure that the
final vote was unanimous. Dickinson almost immediately departed to
fight in the field for the cause he had opposed in the Congress. He
earlier had accepted a commission as colonel of the First Battalion of
Associators in the City and Liberties of Philadelphia. Now he led
Pennsylvania militiamen to northern New Jersey to reinforce General
Washington. Because of Dickinson's stand on independence, however, a
.42. Franklin's draft was stronger mostly because of a general power given to
Congress to regulate commerce (Article V). It can be found in The Avalon Project at
Yale Law School, available at http://www.yale.eduflawweb/avalon/contcong/07-21-
75.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2003). Dickinson's draft, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/artconf.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2003), replaced the
power to regulate commerce with a much narrower power to regulate weights and
measures (Article XVIII). The final draft, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/artconf.htm, was weaker than Dickinson's, not so
much for reasons of substance but because it was more explicit on the reservation of non-
delegated powers to the states (Article II).
Some historians have exaggerated the differences between Dickinson's draft and
the final Articles of Confederation. E.g., 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 4-
6 (editor's introduction); MCDONALD, Novus, supra note 2, at 38-39; WOOD, supra note
2, at 358. Actually, the differences were not that great. The Dickinson draft stated that
Congress could not "interfere with the internal Police of any colony, any further than
such Police may be affected by the Articles of this Confederation." Based on
contemporary usage of the term "internal police" and the enumeration of powers given
the confederation, this left a great deal of power in the states. See The Avalon Project at
Yale Law School, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/contcong/07-12-
76.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2003); cf Jacobson, supra note 2, at 118.
In Congress, Thomas Burke of North Carolina sought a more specific reservation
of power to the states. 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 6 (editor's
introduction). The result was Article II of the finished Articles ("Each state retains its
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which
is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress
assembled."). James Wilson, like some historians, purported to see in this a major
difference between the drafts. Id. at 6. 1 have examined both drafts point by point, and to
me the difference seems to be more one of emphasis than of substance. This conclusion
is buttressed by the fact that Burke was not opposed to a fairly strong union. In 1780, he
promoted bills to give Congress the power to levy duties and regulate commerce. Id.
Burke simply wished a more explicit statement of what was reserved.
43. For an outline of Dickinson's argument, see Jacobson, supra note 2, at 113-15.
Historian Gordon Wood wrote that Dickinson also feared a rupture from Britain because
such an event might cut America "off from the source of its own life-blood of liberty."
WOOD, supra note 2, at 45; see also JEFFERSON, supra note 30.
For an explanation of Dickinson's opposition to independence based on his
personality, see Johannesen, supra note 2, at 28-31.
[Vol. 108:2
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new Pennsylvania constitutional convention dismissed him from
Congress.44
His initial military career was a short one. After six weeks of
service, his unit was recalled to Philadelphia,45 and on September 28 he
resigned when hostile politicians in Philadelphia promoted two other
officers over him.46
Dickinson was elected to the Pennsylvania Assembly again in late
1776,47 but soon resigned and moved to his estate near Dover,
Delaware.48 He probably joined the Delaware militia as a private.49 In
any event, he did not become an active member of Congress again until
1779.50 He refused election to the Delaware Assembly in 1780, but
accepted election to the Delaware executive council in 1781. The
Delaware Assembly then chose him as President of the state for a three-
year term by a vote of 25-1, the dissenter being Dickinson himself.5' The
next year his other home state claimed him, making him President of
Pennsylvania.52 (He was, until he resigned firom the Delaware post two
months later, the chief executive of both states.) 53 He served as President
of Pennsylvania for three years. In 1783, at the initiative of Benjamin
Rush, the Pennsylvania state assembly chartered a new educational
institution in Carlisle to be named Dickinson College.
After leaving office, Dickinson moved to Wilmington. By that
time, the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation as a permanent
government had become apparent to nearly all. In 1785, Virginia called
a commercial convention for Annapolis. Delhware was one of five states
sending representatives, and Dickinson headed its delegation. When the
Annapolis Convention met in September 1786, the delegates elected
Dickinson the convention chairman.54 In that capacity, he was the
principal "conspirator ' 55 with Alexander Hamilton and James Madison
in promoting the idea of a plenary constitutional convention in
Philadelphia.56
44. Jacobson, supra note 2, at 119.
45. FLOWER, supra note 2, at 175; cf Jacobson, supra note 2, at 119.
46. FLOWER, supra note 2, at 176; Jacobson, supra note 2, at 119.
47. FLOWER, supra note 2, at 179.
48. Jacobson, supra note 2, at 121.
49. There seems to be little documentary evidence for this other than Dickinson's
statements. Jacobson, supra note 2, at 121-22; cf. FLOWER, supra note 2, at 185.
50. See generally 13-15 J. CONT. CONG. (1779).
51. FLOWER, supra note 2, at 201; Jacobson, Stipra note 2, at 122.
52. Jacobson, supra note 2, at 122.
53. BRADFORD, FATHERS, supra note 2, at 101; FLOWER, supra note 2, at 211;
Jacobson, supra note 2, at 122.
54. FLOWER, supra note 2, at 238.
55. MCDONALD, supra note 2, at 247; cf FLOWER, supra note 2, at 238-39.
56. McDONALD, supra note 2, at 247; cf FLOWER, supra note 2, at 238-39.
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Delaware sent Dickinson as one of its five delegates to the
Philadelphia convention. 57  He arrived on May 2958 and stayed until
nearly the end.59 During much of the time his health was suffering.6 °
However, he found his fellow delegates politically congenial, for early in
the convention, he told Benjamin Rush that the delegates "are all united
in their objects, and he expects they will be equally united in the means
of attaining them. '' 61 During the convention, he prepared his own draft
57. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 16.
58. Id. at 16, 17. There are two letters extant from his friend and fellow delegate
George Read, who was already in Philadelphia, importuning him to come. See Letter
from George Reed, to John Dickinson (May 21, 1787), in 3 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra
note 2, at 24-26; Letter from George Reed, to John Dickinson (May 25, 1787), in 4
FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 61-62. Nothing of substance had been
accomplished in open convention before he arrived, other than the election of
Washington as convention president.
59. It used to be thought that Dickinson may have absented himself for about a
month because the convention notes do not show him speaking from June 21 to July 25.
Hutson, supra note 2, at 262; see also 3 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 587 (listing
dates of attendance). In 1983, however, some of Dickinson's personal convention notes
were published for the first time. They demonstrate he was present on several days in
that period. Hutson, supra note 2, at 271-80 (notes that can be dated to June 29, June 30,
and July 9-14). Ill-health may have prevented him from speaking and may have kept him
away some days.
In his famous collection of sketches of his fellow-delegates, William Pierce of
Georgia described Dickinson this way:
Mr. Dickinson has been famed through all America, for his Farmers Letters; he
is a Scholar, and said to be a Man of very extensive information. When I saw
him in the Convention I was induced to pay the greatest attention to him
whenever he spoke. I had often heard that he was a great Orator, but I found
him an indifferent Speaker. With an affected air of wisdom he labors to
produce a trifle,-his language is irregular and incorrect,-his flourishes (for
he sometimes attempts them), are like expiring flames, they just shew [sic]
themselves and go out;-no traces of them are left on the mind to chear [sic] or
animate it. He is, however, a good writer and will ever be considered one of
the most important characters in the United States. He is about 55 years old
[actually, he was 54], and was bred a Quaker.
3 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 92.
The French chargd de affairs sized up Dickinson thus:
John Dickinson. Auteur des lettres du fermier de Pensylvanie; homme trks
riche, tant au co[m]mencement de la rdvolution du parti anti anglican, sans
cependant favoriser l'indipendance, contre laquelle il a mme vot
publiquement. II est vieux, foible et sans influence ....
Id. at 237.
That is:
John Dickinson. Author of the Letters of a Farmer from Pennsylvania; very
rich man; was from the beginning of the revolution in the anti-English faction,
without however favoring independence, against which he voted publically. He
is old, weak, and without influence ....
Id. (translation by Professor Mark Kende)
As this Article suggests, at least the last part of the assessment was inaccurate.
60. Hutson, supra note 2, at 262.
61. 3 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 33 (Benjamin Rush to Richard Price).
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constitution, which I shall refer to as the "Dickinson Plan." It shares
62
many affinities with the final document.
Certainly Dickinson had no hesitation about endorsing that final
document; before departing, he instructed his friend and fellow Delaware
delegate, George Read, to affix his signature to the finished
Constitution.6 3
In 1788, Dickinson campaigned for ratification of the Constitution
by composing and arranging publication of nine public letters written
under the pseudonym "Fabius. ' '64 Designed to jump-start a ratification
process that Dickinson thought was stalled,65 the letters were well
received and widely reprinted.66
Dickinson's most recent biographer has noted a fundamental shift in
Dickinson's religious attitudes during the Confederation period.67
Although born a Quaker, Dickinson had never been a particularly
religious one, and could never be induced to attend Friends' Sunday
Meetings.6 8  Yet he took the faith seriously enough to mind its
admonitions on slavery. To be sure, he had never had much use for
slavery. As a young man he had written to his father from London to
condemn in searing terms the effect of the institution on the masters.6 9
Of course, many slaveholders in the founding generation condemned the
institution, but never freed their slaves. Dickinson did. In September
1781 he finished manumitting all of them.70 Four years later, he drafted
and strenuously supported a bill for the gradual abolition of slavery in
Delaware.7'
62. Hutson, supra note 2, at 264-69, reproduces both a rough and a more finished
draft of the Dickinson Plan.
63. The note containing these instructions is dated September 15, 1787, and is
reproduced in 3 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 81.
64. The name "Fabius," like many of the pseudonyms used during the ratification
process, was drawn from the history of the Roman republic. Quintus Fabius Maximus
Cunctator ("the Delayer") was a Roman general who fought Hannibal by avoiding
pitched battles (in which Hannibal was almost invincible) in favor of cautious guerilla-
style tactics. Because Washington employed similar tactics throughout much of the
Revolution, he sometimes was called "the American Fabius." The pseudonym reflects, I
think, Dickinson's wish to communicate the cautious nature of his character. Accord
MCDONALD, Novus, supra note 2, at 277.
For a summary of the argument in the "Fabius" letters, see Gregory S. Ahern,
The Spirit of American Constitutionalism: John Dickinson 's Fabius Letters, available at
http://www.nhinet.org/ahern.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
65. 2 WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 69.
66. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 79-80 (editor's introduction).
67. FLOWER, supra note 2, at 200-01.
68. See generally id
69. London Letters, supra note 2, at 278.
70. FLOWER, supra note 2, at 200. Milton Flower argues that there were also
financial incentives for manumission. Only six slaves were involved. Id.
71. STILL, supra note 2, at 323-24, 424-31.
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Looking back from 1787 and 1788, one might say that Dickinson's
career had not exactly unfolded in a straight line. Perhaps that was a
philosophical strength. Possessed of the wealth of a fine classical
education, he drew on it heavily and wore it lightly. By birth a farmer,
he had earned his living as one, and as a lawyer as well. With no
apparent lust for political office, he had served as legislator, delegate in
Congress, and president of two different states. With no desire to sever
ties with Britain, he had first remonstrated for and then fought for the
American cause. Although suffering the pains of what was in those days
advanced middle age, he made the trip to the Philadelphia convention to
serve as one of the more experienced delegates. It should be no surprise
then that his ideas and life experiences were to seep into the document
that convention produced.
III. Dickinson's Political Philosophy
A. Dickinson's Consistency
Throughout his life, John Dickinson's basic political philosophy
retained a consistency and integrity remarkable for a person actively
involved in a career in practical politics. 72 There were refinements, of
course. Yet one can examine writings written over two decades, in the
heat of the hour, and find very little inconsistent-and much mutual
reinforcement-in them.
B. Humans as Social Creatures
Dickinson believed that man was endowed with natural rights as a
gift from God.73 In his view, the Creator74 wanted man to be self-
fulfilled: "Man is born for himself. It is not only his right, but his duty
to pursue his own happiness., 75 Because God made humans to be social
creatures, they can find happiness and freedom only in the society of
72. At the end of his otherwise admirable monograph on Dickinson's political career
from 1764 through 1776, David L. Jacobson concluded that Dickinson was "not a
systematic thinker, but a politician whose expressions were called forth by the needs of
the time." Jacobson, supra note 2, at 124. However, this conclusion does not follow
from Jacobson's own careful tracings of Dickinson's writings nor from independent
analysis.
73. Ford, supra note 2, at 262 (writing in his Address to Barbados that royal charters
of liberties were "declarations but not gifts of liberties" that came from God).
74. Cf BuRKE's POLITICS, supra note 2, at xv (editors' introduction) ("[T]he primary
business of the legislator or statesman was to ascertain, obey, and promote obedience to
the precepts of the Creator as these could be discerned in the natural order.").
75. 2 WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 253 (Fabius, Second Series, Letter XIII).
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others.76  Humans have a dual nature, with both self-love and social
instincts. 77  These are interwoven and synergistic as such: "In the
constitution which our Maker has assigned to man, two dispositions are
observable; love of self and social affection. They are compatible,
innocently, virtuously, advantageously, compatible, or they would not
have been 'joined together.' Their union is the means to good ends. 78
And again, stated as follows: "Right involves duty. He grossly errs, if
he supposes he can obtain it, by disregarding the happiness of others.
Self love and social are as intimately united as colours in a ray of light.
The ray without one of them would be imperfect [i.e., incomplete]."79
To be sure, Dickinson cautioned, self-love was not the same as
unbridled selfishness: "Self-love and selfishness are very different.
Self-love has its laws. Selfishness has none." 80 "A people," he wrote,
"is travelling fast to destruction, when individuals consider their interests
as distinct from those of the public.
'" 81
Prior to entering political society, Dickinson implied, people had
two sorts of rights or powers-those whose exercise could harm others
76. 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 168 (Fabius, First Series, Letter
I11).
Compare the argument outlined in the text with the following passage from
Edmund Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France:
They all know or feel this great ancient truth: Quod illi principi et praepotenti
Deo qui omnem hunc mundum regit, nihil eorum quae quidem fiant in terris
acceptius quam concilia et coetus hominum jure sociati quae civitates
appellantur. [Among those things that occur on this earth, nothing is more
pleasing to that governing and greatly powerful God who rules the whole world
than the councils and joining together of people by the law of association that
we call civil government] .... [T]hey think themselves bound ... to perform
their national homage to the institutor and author and protector of civil society;
without which civil society man could not by any possibility arrive at the
perfection of which his nature is capable, nor even make a remote and faint
approach to it. They conceive that He who gave our nature to be perfected by
our virtue willed also the necessary means of its perfection. He willed
therefore the state-He willed its connection with the source and original
archetype of all perfection.
BURKE, supra note 2. All translations from the Latin in this Article are by the author.
In the eighteenth century, the verb "to perfect" had the sense of "to complete,"
and "perfection" of "completion." Thus, SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755) defines "perfect" primarily in the sense of its Latin root,
perficere, "to complete." Cf U.S. CONST. pmbl. ("to form a more perfect union").
77. 2 WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 248 (Fabius, Second Series, Letter XIII).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 253 (Fabius, Second Series, Letter XIII). Dickinson's theme of the
intertwining of interest and duty appears in other writings as well. See his discussion of
Congress in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 122-25 (Fabius, First Series,
Letter II).
80. 2 WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 253 (Fabius, Second Series, Letter XIII).
81. Farmer, supra note 2, at 77 (Letter X11).
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and those whose exercise affected only oneself.82 Upon entering political
society, people contributed some of their rights or powers to the central
authority.83 Ideally, those contributed should be those in the first
category: Man "must submit his will, in what concerns all, to the will of
the whole society, ' '84 and "[th]e authority of the whole, must be co-
extensive with its interests. We may think of the rights contributed as
one's "alienable rights" and those that ought not be contributed as
"unalienable rights." When all people yielded to society the power to
injure others, then all could enjoy their retained rights more fully because
everyone received protection from injury and freedom from fear.
86
Everyone benefited as a result. This was the common good or the
general welfare.87 Dickinson's rhetorical emphasis on this natural law
and social contract theory differs from that of Edmund Burke, another
Whig statesman with whom he often has been compared. 88
82. Dickinson does not seem to have distinguished in this context between rights and
powers.
83. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 169 (Fabius, First Series, Letter
IIl).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 170. Dickinson's concept is superficially similar to Locke's, but Locke
would have granted society a limited power over rights Dickinson believed should be
retained:
The first power, viz., of doing whatsoever he thought fit for the preservation of
himself and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by
the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself and the rest of that
society shall require; which laws of the society in many things confine the
liberty he had by the law of Nature.
Secondly, [t]he power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his natural
force (which he might before employ in the execution of the law of Nature ....
LOCKE, supra note 2, at 105.
86. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 169 (Fabius, First Series, Letter
III).
87. The phrase "general welfare" was one of Dickinson's favorites. See, e.g.,
Farmer, supra note 2, at 9 (Letter 11); id. at 69 (Letter XI); 14 J. CONT. CONG. 651 (1779)
(criticizing price-gougers by claiming that their activities were contrary to the "general
welfare" in his draft for Congress of the address, To the Inhabitants of the United States
of America (May 26, 1779)); see also id. at 653; 2 WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 168, 181,
195 (Fabius, Second Series, Letters I, III, V).
88. There have been various attempts to claim Dickinson for a sort of Burkean
conservatism. His first biographer, Charles J. Stilld, made much of Dickinson's reliance
on English legalisms rather than theories of natural law. STILLt, supra note 2. Professor
M.E. Bradford, a conservative in the tradition of the American South, also described
Dickinson as "an American Burke." BRADFORD, FATHERS, supra note 2, at 102-03; see
also BRADFORD, REASON, supra note 2, at 79-96. The comparison to Burke has
something to it insofar as they both were Whigs who favored choosing political means
more on the basis of experience than of abstract reasoning.
However, the comparison is overdrawn in part because of Dickinson's heavy
reliance on natural law as the source of "first principles." See also Jacobson, supra note
2, at 34, 39, 50, 55, 76. (Later, Jacobson seems to overstate Dickinson's devotion to
natural law compared to history. Id. at 124). Dickinson then turned to historical and
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C. The Purpose of Government
Dickinson believed in identifying ends before means.89 One should
ascertain the purpose of a governmental establishment before choosing
its structure or enacting its laws. 90 The ideal purpose was to promote the
common good or general welfare. 9' In his draft of the Declaration of the
Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms, Dickinson wrote, "Government
was instituted to promote the Welfare of Mankind, and ought to be
administered for the Attainment of that End., 92 In adopting this view,
Dickinson was adhering to Whig faith.93 John Locke had said something
very much like it.94 So also had the highly influential95 essays by John
Trenchard and Thomas Gordon published as Cato's Letters, with which
Dickinson was familiar.96 In this respect, moreover, Dickinson and
Burke agreed. Burke had described Parliament as "one interest, that of
prudential considerations only as a means of vindicating natural rights. In addition, his
later support for the French republic distinguishes him sharply from Burke, whose lasting
reputation is built largely on his opposition to that regime.
On a personal level, Dickinson was talented and creative by almost any other
measure, but not by the measure of Burke. In the latter's presence, even the formidable
Samuel Johnson could feel pressed. Once when Johnson was ill and reduced in energy,
he said of Burke, "That fellow calls forth all my powers. Were I to see Burke now it
would kill me." JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, L.L.D. 287 (Robert
Maynard Hutchins et al. eds., 1952).
89. See 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 42 (McHenry, May 30) (proposing
that powers of the federal branches ought to be ascertained before their structure was
determined); see also id. at 74 (Pierce, June 1) ("Mr. Dickinson was of opinion that the
powers of the Executive ought to be defined before we say in whom the power shall
vest.").
90. Id. at 42, 74.
91. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 181 (Fabius, First Series, Letter IV)
(identifying the object of government as increasing the safety and repose of the governed
and "the advancement of their happiness in other respects"); id. at 195 (Fabius, First
Series, Letter V) ("government is intended for the happiness of the people" and "the end
of legitimate government ... is, the general welfare"); see also Jacobson, supra note 2,
at 76 (summarizing the argument in Dickinson's Essay on the Constitutional Power of
Great Britain); cf. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 80 (Fabius, First Series,
Letter 1) ("what concerns should be considered by all"); id. at 80-81 (Fabius, First Series,
Letter I) (regretting that sectional and economic interests could warp even the views of
the intelligent as to what is best for the general welfare).
92. 2 J. CONT. CONG. 141 (1775). Although Dickinson and Jefferson were uneasy
collaborators on this document, this particular language was Dickinson's. Jacobson,
supra note 2, at 96.
93. WOOD, supra note 2, at 55.
94. Cf. LOCKE, supra note 2, at 106 ("[T]he power of the society or legislative
constituted by them can never be supposed to extend farther than the common good.").
95. BAILYN, supra note 2, at 54; see also COLBOURN, supra note 2, passim
(discussing the omnipresence of these essays in America).
96. E.g., I CATO, supra note 2, at 175, 176, 179, 405, 411. Dickinson cited Cato's
Letters as early as 1765 in his pamphlet, The Late Regulations Respecting the British
Colonies on the Continent ofAmerica Considered. Ford, supra note 2, at 242-43.
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the whole, where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide,
but the general good.,
97
Dickinson believed that to advance the general welfare government
must respect freedom98  and protect good citizens from bad:
"[T]ranquility and prosperity have commonly been promoted [in
republics] in proportion to the strength of their government for protecting
the worthy against the licentious."99 This was true of foreign affairs as
well: "[S]uch establishments as tend most to protect the worthy against
the licentious, tend most to protect all against foreigners" because "the
government will partake of the qualities of those whose authority is
prevalent."100 Perhaps somewhat circularly, he described the "worthy" in
the words of Horace, the Roman poet: "Qui consulta patrum, qui leges
juraque servat"' 0'-which, loosely translated, means "those who obey
the law and respect the rights of others." At several points Dickinson
suggested that laws inconsistent with government's general welfare
purpose were ultra vires, not binding on the citizenry, and should be
resisted. 1
02
D. The Public Trust
John Locke had characterized government as a trust, with officials
as trustees and the people as beneficiaries.' 0 3 The public trust concept
97. BAILYN, supra note 2, at 84-85.
98. Ford supra note 2, at 202 (Dickinson's Address on the Stamp Act); id at 262
(Dickinson's Address to the Committee.of Correspondence in Barbados); cf COLBOURN,
supra note 2, at 78 (Locke's connection between religion, happiness, virtue, and
freedom).
99. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 168.
100. Id. at 195 (Fabius, First Series, Letter V).
101. Id. The reference is to Horace, Epp. 1.16.40-41: Vir bonus est quis? Qui
consulta patrum, qui leges iuraque seruat, quo multae magnaeque secantur iudice lites,
quo res sponsore et quo causae teste tenentur. Translated as: "Who is a worthy man? He
who honors the commands of the senate, the law, and private rights, by whose judgment
many and great legal disputes are cut short, by whose guarantee affairs are ordered,
through whose testimony cases are judged."
102. See Jacobson, supra note 2, at 39-40, 76; see also Ford, supra note 2, at 184
(suggesting, in his draft of the Declaration of Rights: Resolutions of Stamp Act Congress,
that parliamentary taxes on the colonies were inconsistent with principles of freedom and
not binding on the colonists). For an analysis on how Dickinson saw the interplay of
local conditions and the general welfare as militating against independence, see
Johannesen, supra note 2, at 78.
103. LOCKE, supra note 2, at 18 ("nor under the dominion of any will or restraint of
any law, but what that legislative shall enact according to the trust put in it"), 110 ("to the
legislative, acting pursuant to their trust"), 113-114 ("the community put the legislative
power into such hands as they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be governed by
declared laws, or else their peace, quiet, and property will still be at the same uncertainty
as it was in the state of nature"), 116-17 ("But government, into whosesoever hands it is
put, being, as I have before shown, entrusted with this condition, and for this end, that
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became very popular among the eighteenth century English Opposition'
0 4
authors who influenced American Whigs. Cato's Letters were replete
with the language of public trust.10 5 So also were the writings of Henry
St. John Bolingbroke. 10 6 We have seen that Dickinson was familiar with
"Cato.", 10 7 He had read and admired Bolingbroke while studying at the
Middle Temple. 10 8  Among Americans, there were many in his
generation who applied the trust metaphor to government. 0 9 Indeed, the
constitutions of both states in which Dickinson served in elective
office-Delaware and Pennsylvania-explicitly referred to government
as a trust.' 1 
0
As a real property and estates lawyer, Dickinson was comfortable
with trust principles. That he thought they ought to be applied to
government is evident as early as 1764; in that year, he wrote a private
letter comparing the royal grant of Pennsylvania to William Penn to a
"declaration of trust," with Penn as trustee and his fellow-settlers as
beneficiaries' l"-and, presumably, with the Crown as settlor.
men might have and secure their properties."), 129 ("The power of assembling and
dismissing the legislative, placed in the executive, gives not the executive a superiority
over it, but is fiduciary trust placed in him for the safety of the people.").
104. The term refers primarily to the opposition to the Walpole ministry, although it
also denotes seventeenth century opposition to the Stuart kings. On opposition to
Walpole, the "Archcorrupter," see COLBOURN, supra note 2, at 51-53.
105. 1 CATO, supranote 2, at 111, 142, 179,267, 411, 415, 416; 2 CATO, supranote
2, at 558.
106. HENRY ST. JOHN BOLINGBROKE, A Dissertation Upon Parties, in 2 THE WORKS
OF LORD BOLINGBROKE (1967); see, e.g., id. at 45 (a representative in Parliament is the
people's trustee), 93 (a representative has a "great and noble trust"), 100 (the king serves
as trustee of the public revenues), 101 ("[T]he people should have frequent opportunities
of calling their representatives to account, as it were, for the discharge of the trust
committed to them.").
On Bolingbroke's influence, see BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 39-40 n.23 (1967); COLBOURN, supra note 2, at 49-50,
87, 109).
107. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
108. FLOWER, supra note 2, at 17; London Letters, supra note 2, at 449. On
Dickinson's admiration, see H. Trevor Colboum's commentary in London Letters, supra
note 2, at 419.
109. For further discussion of the trust idea among the Founders, see Natelson,
General Welfare Clause, supra note 2, and by the same author, The Constitution and the
Public Trust (forthcoming).
110. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 4, available at The Avalon Project at Yale Law School,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/de02.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2003) ("[A]
councilor will remain in trust for three years."); PA. CONST. of 1776, art. IV, available at
The A valon Project at Yale Law School,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/pa08.htm ("[A]II power being originally
inherent in, and consequently derived from, the people; therefore all officers of
government, whether legislative or executive, are their trustees and servants, and at all
times accountable to them.").
11. FLOWER, supra note 2, at 24-25. Dickinson made the statement in a letter to C.
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Throughout his life, he used the figure in political debate, and notably in
the constitutional debates of the 1780s.11
2
The public trust concept was not mere empty metaphor. Both
opposition writers and American Whigs drew from the law of fiduciaries
specific conclusions about the standards that should guide public
officials.113 Cato's Letters inveighed against diversion of public wealth
for private purposes 1 4 and concluded that the crimes of public
magistrates were greater than those committed by private parties.'
1 5
Samuel von Pufendorf, one of the most popular jurists of the time, had
not used explicitly the language of public trust, but had contended for a
long list of trust-style duties on rulers." 6 Among these were governing
for the public welfare," 7 acquiring necessary knowledge," 8 ultimate
responsibility of the ruler for ministers,' 1 9 impartiality and the equitable
distribution of burdens among citizens, 12 conservation of assets, and
avoidance of faction. 122  Dickinson himself, following William Penn,
argued that the trust duty prohibited officials from changing the form of
government without the consent of the people they served. 23 He thereby
drew a distinction between ordinary laws and the more fundamental law
of a constitution.1 24 Thus, Dickinson, like other opinion-molders of the
Marshall on February 9, 1764 ("I think upon the whole it may be justly observed that to
consider the deeds of lease and release [i.e., conveyance] executed before the Proprietor
[William Penn] set sail to take possession of his grant with his first Adventurers [settlers]
as Declarations of Trust is to consider them in the same light as those adventurers did.")
112. For an early example, see Jacobson, supra note 2, at 17, 23 (in the dispute over
the petition to replace Pennsylvania's propriety charter). For examples in the
constitutional debates, see 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 122 (Fabius, First
Series, Letter II) ("federal trustees or officers"); id. at 171 (Fabius, First Series, Letter III)
(stating that the "trustees or servants of the several states" will protect state sovereignty).
113. Locke made the connection with the private law of trusts explicit:
[W]ho shall be judge whether the trustee or deputy acts well and according to
the trust reposed in him, but he who deputes him, and must, by having deputed
him, have still the power to discard him when he fails in his trust? If this be
reasonable in particular cases of private men, why should it be otherwise in that
of the greatest moment, where the welfare of millions is concerned ....
LOCKE, supra note 2, at 203-04.
114. 1 CATO, supra note 2, at 76.
115. Id. at 141.
116. 2 SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN 11.3 (Frank
Gardner Moore trans., 1964) (1682), available at http://www.constitution.orgipuf/puf-
dut.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2003).
117. Id.
118. Id. at ll.2.
119. Id. at 11.9.
120. Id. at 11.10.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 11.12.
123. Jacobson, supra note 2, at 23.
124. Id. at 17, 26.
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time, shared the view that public trustees should be more than merely
honest.
In his view, public trustees, like their private counterparts, should be
"impartial"125-above faction. 126  Dickinson's favorite author, Francis
Bacon, 127 had written that the best policy for Kings was to hold
themselves above faction128-to "order those things which are general,
wherein men of several factions do nevertheless agree, or in dealing with
correspondence to particular persons, one by one."' 129  In a simile
Dickinson later borrowed for other purposes, 30 Bacon added, "The
motions of factions under the King, ought to be like the motions (as the
astronomers speak) of the inferior orbs, which may have their proper
motions [i.e., their own motions], but yet still are quietly carried by the
higher motion of 'primum mobile."
3' l
In any event, throughout his political life Dickinson repeatedly
promoted the ideal of official impartiality. 132 Indeed, he applied the ideal
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 (1959) ("Duty to deal impartially with
beneficiaries. When there are two or more beneficiaries of a trust, the trustee is under a
duty to deal impartially with them.").
126. BAILYN, supra note 2, at 48 (citing the Whig ideal of the king above politics);
see also PA. CONST. of 1776, pmbl., available at The Avalon Project at Yale Law School,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/pa08.htm. The document under which
Dickinson served read: "[l]t is our indispensable duty to establish such original principles
of government, as will best promote the general happiness of the people of this State, and
their posterity, and provide for future improvements, without partiality for, or prejudice
against any particular class, sect, or denomination of men whatever." 1d; see also id. art.
V ("That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and
security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or
advantage of any single man, family, or sort of men, who are a part only of that
community.").
127. FLOWER, supra note 2, at 17. Dickinson once described Bacon as "the greatest
man that ever livd [sic]." London Letters, supra note 2, at 280.
128. BACON, supra note 2, at 272-73.
129. Id. at 269.
130. See infra notes 279-81 and accompanying text.
131. BACON, supra note 2, at 273. Note that Bacon carefully avoided the then-still
contentious issue of which orbs circled which. This was not the only time Bacon used
the planetary simile. See id. at 115. Primum mobile means "first mover," that is, the
impetus for the system.
132. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 2, at 221-22 (criticizing British trade statutes as
furthering "partial" rather than "general" interests, in The Late Regulations Respecting
the British Colonies on the Continent of America Considered); 17 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 251 (Fabius, First Series, Letter VIII) (defending the new
Constitution by stating, "It cannot be with reason apprehended, that Congress will refuse
to act upon any articles calculated to promote the common welfare, tho' they may be
unwilling to act upon such as are designed to advance PARTIAL interests .. "). At the
constitutional convention, Dickinson looked for ways to overcome local partiality. See,
e.g., 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 114-15 (Madison, July 25); Hutson, supra
note 2, at 281 (annotating his copy of a draft of the Constitution with suggestions that "no
Preference or Advantage to be given to any persons or places-Laws to be equal").
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even to God; when revising Jefferson's draft of the Declaration of the
Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms, Dickinson added an appeal to
"the supreme and impartial Judge and Ruler of the Universe.
' 33
E. Dickinson's Political Philosophy Applied to Financial Exactions
His pre-Revolutionary writings on government financial exactions
are illustrative of how Dickinson's political philosophy affected his
treatment of issues. Those writings make a fundamental distinction
between two kinds of financial exactions: taxes and duties.' 34 Taxes
were impositions for the sole purpose of levying money.135 Duties were
impositions for the purpose of regulating commerce rather than raising
revenue.1 36 Both taxes and duties should be imposed only for the general
welfare. 137
However, the needs of the general welfare mandated different rules
for taxes and for duties. 138  The general welfare required that only
colonial assemblies, not Parliament, have power to control the "internal
police" and property of the colonies. 139  Taxation, like regulation of
manufactures and administration of justice, 140 lay within the "internal"
category:
Men cannot be happy, without Freedom; nor free, without Security of
Property; nor so secure, unless the sole Power to dispose of it be
lodged in themselves; therefore no People can be free, but where
Taxes are imposed on them with their own Consent, given personally,
or by their Representatives.'
4'
133. 2 J. CONT. CONG. 156 (1775) (emphasis added).
134. Farmer, supra note 2, at 21, 23 (Letter IV).
135. Id.; see also id at 44 (Letter VII); cf Ford, supra note 2, at 173-74 (adopting, but
then dropping, a distinction between internal and external taxes in his draft of the Stamp
Act Resolution).
136. Id. at 21, 23 (Letter IV).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 9-10 (Letter II).
139. Id.; Jacobson, supra note 2, at 92. The idea that colonies ought to control their
"internal" government had been popularized by Richard Bland in 1763. COLBOURN,
supra note 2, at 147.
140. Jacobson, supra note 2, at 78.
141. Ford, supra note 2, at 202 (Address on the Stamp Act). From Dickinson's
Address to the Committee of Correspondence in Barbados:
It would be an insult on the divine Majesty to say, that he has given or allowed
any man or body of men a right to make me miserable. If no man or body of
men has such a right, I have a right to be happy. If there can be no happiness
without freedom, I have a right to befree. If I cannot enjoy freedom without
security of property, I have a right to be thus secured If my property cannot be
secure, in case others over whom I have no kind of influence may take it from
me by taxes .... I have an exclusive right to lay taxes on my own property,
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Thus, the ultimate reason Parliament had no power to tax the colonies
was because that power was contrary to the general welfare. 1
42
On the other hand, the general welfare required regulation of
commerce throughout the British Empire. 43 Only Parliament was in the
position to regulate commerce. 44 Parliament, therefore, had the power
to impose duties for this purpose. 145  (In conceding this last point,
Dickinson carried the weight of colonial opinion with him, to Jefferson's
discomfort.) 146  Dickinson even defended Parliament's right, although
not always its wisdom, 47 to impose duties to restrain the commerce of
one part of the empire to protect another-if the imposition was part of
an overall plan to advance the general welfare.' 48
Dickinson opposed efforts to evade the distinction between taxes
and duties.149 It was, in his view, improper for Parliament to subject the
either by myself or those I can trust ....
Id. at 262.
142. Id. at 174 (Dickinson's draft of the Pennsylvania Stamp Act Resolutions), 195
(in the petition from the Stamp Act Congress); Farmer, supra note 2, at 26-33 (Letter V)
(pointing out that there is no need to tax the colonies to keep them profitable for and
dependent on the mother country).
143. Farmer, supra note 2, at 7 (Letter II).
144. Id; see generally Jacobson, supra note 2, at 47, 77.
145. Farmer, supra note 2, at 7 (Letter II).
146. In his autobiography, Jefferson wrote:
[In the Summary View of the Rights of British America] I took the ground
which, from the beginning I had thought the only one orthodox or tenable,
which was that the relation between Gr. Br. and these colonies was exactly the
same as that of England & Scotland after the accession of James & until the
Union, and the same as her present relations with Hanover, having the same
Executive chief but no other necessary political connection; and that our
emigration from England to this country gave her no more rights over us, than
the emigrations of the Danes and Saxons gave to the present authorities of the
mother country over England. In this doctrine however I had never been able
to get any one to agree with me but Mr. Wythe.
He concurred in it from the first dawn of the question: what was the political
relation between us & England? Our other patriots Randolph, the Lees,
Nicholas, Pendleton stopped at the half-way house of John Dickinson who
admitted that England had a right to regulate our commerce, and to lay duties
on it for the purposes of regulation, but not of raising revenue. But for this
ground there was no foundation in compact, in any acknowledged principles of
colonization, nor in reason: expatriation being a natural right, and acted on as
such, by all nations, in all ages.
JEFFERSON, supra note 30.
147. Ford, supra note 2, at 175 (criticizing, in his draft of the Pennsylvania Stamp Act
Resolutions, British trade restraint on prudential rather than constitutional grounds), 186
(making same argument in his draft of the "Declaration of Rights" (Resolutions) of the
Stamp Act Congress); see also id at 213-45 (criticizing British trade policy entirely on
prudential grounds in his pamphlet, The Late Regulations Respecting the British Colonies
on the Continent ofAmerica Considered).
148. Farmer, supra note 2, at 8-9 (Letter I1).
149. FORD, supra note 2, at 231-32.
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colonies to taxes by disguising them as duties. 50 Dickinson understood
that when a charge is imposed on a particular item, the true incidence
(burden) of the charge depends on what we now call the "elasticity of
demand"-the extent to which demand for an item changes in response
to fluctuations in price.151  Charges on articles for which demand was
inelastic (relatively insensitive to fluctuations in price) were really paid
by the consumer, even if the tax was nominally levied on the seller.
Charges on articles for which demand was elastic (sensitive to price
fluctuation), fell on the seller or could, perhaps, be divided between
seller and consumer. From this it followed that when Britain required
colonials to buy a necessary article from her (thereby assuring
inelasticity of demand), she must not load the article with impositions to
raise revenue.' 52 Even if Parliament nominally levied the imposition on
sellers in the mother country, the real burden fell on consumers in the
colonies. Such impositions were taxes. More, they were deceptive
taxes: "This mode of taxation therefore is the mode suited to arbitrary
and oppressive governments.'
' 53
Colonial governments legitimately could tax Americans to promote
the general welfare. Yet a government, like other trustees, should treat
those under its care fairly and impartially. 154 In the realm of taxation,
whoever enjoyed the benefit from the revenue derived should feel also
the burden: "Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus."'' 55 Moreover,
"[t]axes in every free state have been, and ought to be, as exactly
proportioned as is possible to the abilities of those who are to pay them.
They cannot otherwise be just."'
5 6
150. Id.
151. Id. (writing in The Late Regulations Respecting the British Colonies on the
Continent ofAmerica Considered); see also Farmer, supra note 2, at 42 (Letter VII).
152. Farmer, supra note 2, at 14-15 (Letter II).
153. Id. at41 (Letter VII).
154. See id. at 50 (Letter VIII).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 66 (Letter X) (emphasis in original); see also Ford, supra note 2, at 230
(supporting taxes proportioned to ability to pay in The Late Regulations Respecting the
British Colonies on the Continent ofAmerica Considered).
These two principles-that burden should follow benefit and that taxes ought to
be based on ability to pay-potentially may conflict with each other. One way to
reconcile them, at least in part, is to identify classes of beneficiaries and impose the tax
only on them, but scale the imposition according to each person's ability to pay. Thus, a
proposed park may benefit a particular neighborhood disproportionately, and the rest of
the area not at all. Property taxes to pay for the park could be assessed only on the
benefited neighborhood, but according to the value of each owner's property.
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F. Using the Lessons of History To Structure Government To Serve Its
Purpose
How does one, in a fallen world, induce government to rise to such
ideals? "Cato's" answer had been pessimistic: "Nothing but fear and
selfish considerations can keep men within any reasonable bounds.'
157
For John Dickinson, matters weren't quite as dreadful as that. The
passions could be the source of great evil, but "[d]uly governed, they
produce happiness." 5 8 Indeed, "[t]he due regulation of the affections is
the perfection [completion] of man's character."' 159 One achieved that
"due regulation" through well-structured societal institutions; particularly
important were constitutional institutions: "The best foundations of this
protection, that can be laid by men, are a constitution and government
secured, as well as can be, from the undue influence of passions either in
the people or their servants."' 6 °
The role of a constitution was to lay down procedures for managing
the rights and powers that citizens had contributed to the central
authority: "a Constitution is the organization of the contributed rights in
society. '161 A good constitution featured mechanisms to maximize
human advantages and minimize disadvantages. 62 It encouraged good
results and discouraged or raised obstacles to bad onesl 63-the
"cultivation of virtues and correction of errors."' 64  For example,
Dickinson recognized that government should be structured to effectuate
the will of the people. 165 But "the will of the people" could mean their
immediate, short-term, passionate will or their long-term sense of
advantage. 166  A well-constructed constitution would increase the
likelihood that government would further "a reasonable, not a distracted
157. 2 CATO, supra note 2, at 551; cf BAILYN, supra note 2, at 56 (attributing to the
Whigs a belief that man was a depraved creature and that power was a threat to liberty).
158. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 195 (Fabius, First Series, Letter V).
159. 2 WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 253 (Fabius, Second Series, Letter XIII).
160. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 195 (Fabius, First Series, Letter V).
Note Dickinson's use of the phrase "undue influence," a phrase common in the law of
fiduciaries.
161. Id. at 180 (Fabius, First Series, Letter IV).
162. Id. at 196 (Fabius, First Series, Letter V) ("[Tihe principles of their governments,
the advantages and disadvantages of their situations, the methods employed to avail
themselves of the first, and to alleviate the last.").
163. E.g., Hutson, supra note 2, at 272 ("Let us endeavor with united Councils to
establish a Government that not only may render our Nation great respectable free and
happy but also VIRTUOUS.").
164. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 213 (Fabius, First Series, Letter
VI).
165. See id at 182 (Fabius, Second Series, Letter IV).
166. See id.
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Will.'
167
Those crafting a good constitution-placing principles into
practice--could not proceed a priori. 168  Prudent constitution-makers
sought information about how different arrangements had worked in the
past.169  "Experience must be our only guide," was Dickinson's most
famous remark at the Philadelphia convention; "Reason may mislead
US.
' 1 7 0
us ."7
Accordingly, Dickinson sought guidance in the teachings of
history. 17 1  He resorted mostly to the well-documented histories of
Greece, 172 Rome, 173 and Britain. He found British history especially
useful because it "abounds with instances" of how a people had protected
their liberties against their rulers. 1 74 The course of British development
demonstrated the centrality of certain basic liberties, such as the right of
the people to approve all laws and taxes, either in person or through their
representatives; trial by jury; the writ of habeas corpus; holding of lands
by tenure with easy rents; and freedom of the press. 1
75
British history also demonstrated how government might be induced
to adhere to trust standards. One way was to align power and
consequences-a principle inherent in the maxim already cited: "Qui
sentit commodum sentire debet et onus.' 7 6  Another was to align, as
much as possible, the interests of the governors with those of the
governed-another device common in the law of fiduciaries. To the
167. Id. This passage continues: "When frenzy seizes the mass, it would be madness
to think of their happiness, that is, of their freedom." Id.
168. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 278 (Madison, Aug. 13).
169. Id.
170. Id. Compare this statement to Dickinson's comment that "if we are to judge of
the future from the past, which perhaps is a good way of judging such cases." 2
WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 178 (Fabius, Second Series, Letter II).
171. For a brief, although incomplete overview of Dickinson's reliance on history, see
COLBOURN, supra note 2, at 129-44. Jacobson, supra note 2, at 124 is somewhat
dismissive of Dickinson's resort to history, and his monograph does not inform the reader
of the frequency of his subject's use of historical materials.
172. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 81-82 (Fabius, First Series, Letter I) (discussing
how the ancient Greeks suffered because they sacrificed the general interest for local
interests).
173. For example, his second set of "Fabius" letters contains as much Roman history
as anything else. See generally 2 WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 167-286.
174. WOOD, supra note 2, at 7. On Dickinson's use of history, see also id. at 38-39,
49.
175. Dickinson, writing on behalf of Congress, cited these rights in a sort of primer
for French citizens of Quebec unfamiliar with English liberty. 2 WRITINGS, supra note 2,
at 6-8 (Address of Congress to the Inhabitants of Quebec).
Freedom of the press was important if only because under a free constitution it
was the duty of the governed to rectify governors' errors by rectifying mistakes and
appeasing passions. Farmer, supra note 2, at 17 (Letter II).
176. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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extent possible, therefore, a constitution should foster identity of interest,
rather than conflict of interest, between public officials and the
citizenry. 177 To underscore the value of alliance of interests, Dickinson
paraphrased the Roman historian Sallust: "Idem velle, ac idem nolle, id
demum amicitia est"I78 --"to want and not want the same things; that in
the final analysis is friendship." In the founding generation the most
common word for what Dickinson was seeking in this regard was
"sympathy."'1 79
Dickinson favored various constitutional mechanisms for promoting
"sympathy" and the closely allied value of official dependence on the
citizenry. These included frequent elections, 180 large legislatures,' 81
"rotation in office" (term limits), 182 and assurance that citizens with the
vote were themselves independent. 183  As to that last-citizen
independence-neither Dickinson, nor practically any other public figure
among the founding generation, 184 wanted electors who might sell their
political support for bowls of porridge. 185  Only citizens who were
independent, financially and otherwise, could employ unfettered
judgment in public affairs.' 86 That was one reason why, Dickinson said,
177. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 209 (McHenry, Aug. 7)
(Dickinson defending a freehold voting requirement on the ground that the interests of
freeholders and the general public were identical); cf. Fairfax County Resolves, in THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, available at http://.press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/vlchl7sl4.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2003)
("Resolved that the most important and valuable Part of the British Constitution, upon
which it's very Existence depends, is the fundamental Principle of the People's being
governed by no Laws, to which they have not given their Consent, by Representatives
freely chosen by themselves; who are affected by the Laws they enact equally with their
Constituents; to whom they are accountable, and whose Burthens they share.") (emphasis
added).
178. 2 WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 265 (Fabius, Second Series, Letter XIV).
Dickinson adapted the quotation from Sallust's Bellum Catalinae, c. 20, available at
http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/sall.l.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2003) ("nam idem velle
atque idem nolle, est demum firma amicitia est"-"for to want and not want the same
things is, in the final analysis, what strong friendship is all about.").
179. On sympathy as a constitutional value, see Natelson, Sympathy and
Independence, supra note 2, at 358-82. See also Farmer, supra note 2, at 39 (Letter VII)
(noting that legislators are less scrupulous in making laws that do not bind them
personally).
180. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 123 (Fabius, First Series, Letter II).
181. Id. at 122-23.
182. ld. at 123.
183. Id.
184. On the Founders' universal belief that only independent citizens should have
political influence, see Natelson, Sympathy and Independence, supra note 2, at 382-90.
This was a standard Whig position. 2 CATO, supra note 2, at 607 (identifying bad effects
of dependence).
185. See 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 123 (Madison, July 26).
186. See id. (expressing the view that only freeholders should vote). Madison wrote:
Mr. Dickenson [sic] had a very different idea of the tendency of vesting the
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"we cannot be free, without being secure in our property."' 87  This is
consistent with his support for institution of the militia, which offered
citizens military independence, as the preferred alternative to standing
armies.
Not only should voting citizens be independent, but so also should
branches of government remain independent from each other. Neither
Dickinson nor practically any other Founder was a proponent of branches
of government "working together.' ' 189 As the principal drafter of the
Continental Congress's Address to the Inhabitants of Quebec, he related
at length the evils of the political system that the British government had
erected in that province. 19°  Prominent among those evils was a
legislature and judiciary dependent on the governor, and a governor
dependent on the Crown.' 91 Dickinson, like the other Founders, was
convinced that to promote free and impartial government, a constitution
ought to institutionalize tension between the branches of government.
192
Each branch would be ultimately dependent on the people, and
independent from the others who compete to serve the popular interest:
"FOR WHO ARE A FREE PEOPLE? Not those, over whom
government is reasonable and equitably exercised, but those, who live
under government so constitutionally checked and controlled, that proper
provision is made against its being otherwise exercised."' 193 And again:
[A] government should be divided into three or four parts-as
thereby there will be more obstructions interposed, against errors,
feuds, and frauds, in the administration, and the interference of the
people need be less frequent... the departments so constituted may
therefore be said to be balanced.
94
Dickinson was an admirer of the British Constitution. 195 In Great
right of suffrage in the freeholders of the Country. He considered them as the
best guardians of liberty; And the restriction of the right to them as a necessary
defence agst. [sic] the dangerous influence of those multitudes without property
& without principle ....
Id. at 202 (Madison, Aug.7).
187. Farmer, supra note 2, at 80 (Letter XI1).
188. See, e.g., London Letters, supra note 2, at 445, 448-49 (expressing disgust at the
British government's willingness to rely on mercenaries for defense rather than local
militia).
189. Natelson, Sympathy and Independence, supra note 2, at 417-18.
190. 2 WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 13-14.
191. Id.
192. See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
193. Farmer, supra note 2, at 43-44 (Letter VII).
194. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 181 (Fabius, First Series, Letter
IV); cf Hutson, supra note 2, at 264-69 (proposing a plan for a federal constitution that
would divide the government into judicial, executive, and two legislative branches).
195. 1 FARRAND, supra note 2, at 136 (Madison, June 6).
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Britain, liberty had been preserved largely by the balance between the
House of Lords, the House of Commons, the executive, and the
judiciary. 196 The House of Lords derived its independence from the other
branches through a power to block bills enacted by the Commons, and
from the independence its members enjoyed due to their personal estates
and influence.' 97 The House of Commons derived its power from the
people, on whom it was duly dependent. 98 Its most important check on
the other branches was control over salaries and other aspects of the
''purse-strings," so that the executive could "be brought into order
without violence,"' 99 thereby rendering both the executive and courts at
least somewhat dependent on the people.200 The executive should be
denied any appropriation power, for those who applied the money should
not have the right to levy it.20 ' All governmental funding should flow
from legislative appropriations; there should be no "PERMANENT
support for the offices of government.',
20 2
In Britain, the executive preserved its independence from the other
branches though the prestige of the Crown, the power to create peers, the
authority to veto legislation, and the ability to influence the Commons
with patronage. 20 3  The British judiciary had become relatively
independent, a development Dickinson supported to ensure the "purity of
the courts of law."2 °4 For like other good Whigs,2 °5 he supported the rule
196. Cf BURKE'S POLITICS, supra note 2, at xix (editors' introduction) (noting that
Edmund Burke also desired to preserve the monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic
elements of the British constitution); see also WOOD, supra note 2, at 604.
197. Cf. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 122 (Fabius, First Series, Letter
II) (pointing out that, with a numerous senate, "influence must encrease [sic] with
enlargement").
198. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
199. Farmer, supra note 2, at 51 (Letter IX).
200. Id. at 55 (Letter IX); see also id at 57 (Letter IX) ("Is it possible to form an idea
of a slavery more complete, more miserable, more disgraceful, than that of a people,
where justice is administered, government exercised, and a standing army maintained,
AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PEOPLE, and yet WITHOUT THE LEAST
DEPENDENCE UPON THEM?").
201. Id.at52.
202. Id. at 51 (Letter IX). This is a caution often disregarded in the drafting of state
constitutions, where particular programs or executive branch agencies are provided with
permanent funding. See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 4 (permanent funding for anti-
tobacco programs), art. X, §§ 2, 3 (state lands serving as a permanent funding source for
public schools).
203. Farmer, supra note 2, at 36 (Letter VI) ("The crown, by the constitution, has the
prerogative of creating peers. The existence of that order, in due number and dignity, is
essential to the constitution ...."); id at 39 (Letter VII) (stating that the veto of the lords
and crown "seems... to have been vested in them, more for their own security, than for
any other purpose"); see also 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 123 (Fabius,
First Series, Letter II) (stating that the presidential veto would help prevent cabal).
204. Farmer, supra note 2, at 52-54 (Letter IX).
205. E.g., 1 CATO, supra note 2, at 181.
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of law. That meant that the law was to be kept certain, for uncertainty
"RENDERS PROPERTY PRECARIOUS, and GREATLY EXPOSES
US TO THE ARBITRARY DECISION OF BAD JUDGES. 2 °6  He
followed Beccaria's dictum that good laws should prevent radical
inequalities and "diffuse their influence universally and equally.,
20 7
Dickinson, like many other Founders, believed that the greatest
enemies of free, impartial government were those who conspired to
prostitute political power for non-public ends.20 8  The founding
generation called those conspiracies "cabals," "combinations," "juntos,"
"parties," or "factions., 20 9  The public happiness required that the
schemes of factions be curbed before they came to fruition.
210
Otherwise, "usurpations, which might have been successfully opposed at
first, acquire strength by continuance, and thus become irresistible.,
21
The preferred way to check factions was constitutionally, so that intense
public response did not become necessary.212
Thus, a good constitution provided for elections in which voters
were physically dispersed rather than crowded together. 21 3 Dispersion
made passion and conspiracy less feasible.214 A good constitution
extended governmental units over wide areas, embracing a multiplicity
of private interests, so as to reduce the power of any small group of
interests. 215 Nevertheless, even the best of constitutional devices might
fail, so the public must be ever vigilant:
A perpetual jealousy, respecting liberty, is absolutely requisite in all
free states. The very texture of their constitution, in mixed
governments demands it. For the cautions with which each power is
distributed among the several orders, imply, that each has that share
which is proper for the general welfare, and therefore that any further
acquisition must be pernicious.216
Indeed,
206. Farmer, supra note 2, at 55 (Letter IX).
207. 2 WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 5 (The Address of Congress to the Inhabitants of
Quebec).
208. See Farmer, supra note 2, at 16 (Letter III).
209. Natelson, Sympathy and Independence, supra note 2, at 363-65.
210. Farmer, supra note 2, at 16 (Letter III).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 123 (Fabius, First Series, Letter I1).
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., I FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 158-59 (King, June 7). This
point was made more famously by James Madison in Federalist No. 10.
216. Farmer, supra note 2, at 68 (Letter XI); see also 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 181 (Fabius, First Series, Letter IV) (stating that it is the people's duty to
oversee government if bad administration occurs notwithstanding the constitutional
balance).
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The rights of the subject therefore cannot be too often considered,
explained or asserted: And whoever attempts to do this, shows
himself, whatever may be the rash and peevish reflections of
pretended wisdom, and pretended duty, a friend to those who
injudiciously exercise their power, as well as to them, over whom it is
so exercised.
2 17
In extreme cases, the public might have to respond militarily to break the
excesses of faction.218 This would be unfortunate, for "[t]he cause of
liberty is a cause of too much dignity to be sullied by turbulence and
tumult.,,
2 19
G. Dickinson's Understanding of Federalism
As the principal author of the Articles of Confederation and as the
president of two states, Dickinson had thought a good deal about
federalism. He viewed the relationship between confederation and
member state as analogous to that between political society and
individual.220  Just as individuals contributed some of their rights or
powers to society so as to better enjoy those retained, members of
confederations contributed some of their rights/powers to a central
authority so as to more fully enjoy the rest.22 1 Just as individuals should
contribute to society those rights/powers whose exercise might harm
others, member states should contribute rights/powers to the
confederation whose exercise might harm other member states.
222
In essence, Dickinson's was an "externality" theory of federalism.
The central power ought to govern matters with interstate consequences
or, to formulate it a different way, matters in which control by member
states could impose negative externalities on other member states. 3
224This sort of federalism required a fairly tight combination of states.
Dickinson contended that, historically, the predominant vice of
confederations had been insufficient unity in the face of common
217. Farmer, supra note 2, at 69 (Letter XI).
218. Id. at 17 (Letter II1).
219. Id.; see also id. at 18 (stating that if requests are disregarded, citizens should
oppose without breaking laws, and that force is the last resort), 70 (Letter XI).




223. Cf Political Thought, supra note 2, at 8-9 ("[H]e nevertheless believed that the
scope of the powers of the Federal Government should always be broad enough to cover
the whole field of national interests."). I discuss this externality approach to
constitutionalism briefly in Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 2, at 489-93.
224. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 247 (Fabius, First Series, Letter
VIII).
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problems: "The uniform tenor of history ... holds up the licentiousness
of the people, and turbulent temper of some of the states, as the only
causes to be dreaded, not the conspiracies offederal officers."
225
In the course of discussing confederations in his 1788 "Fabius"
letters, Dickinson offered both negative and positive historical
226illustrations. The Amphictyonic Council of ancient Greece was his
primary negative model.227 In that confederation, he argued, "the parts
were not sufficiently combined, to guard against the ambitious,
avaricious, and selfish projects of some of them .. ,,228 The member
states had retained too many powers to harm others. He drew a positive
model from ancient Greece as well-the Achaean League, which he said
had been more unified and therefore more successful:
229
[T]he wit of man never invented such an antidote against monarchical
and aristocratical projects, as a strong combination of truly
democratical republics. By strictly or truly democratical republics,
the writer means republics, in which all the officers are from time to
time chosen by the people.
The reason is plain. As liberty and equality, or as termed by
Polybius, benignity, were the foundations of their institutions, and the
energy of the government pervaded all the parts in things relating to
the whole, it counteracted for the common welfare, the designs
hatched by selfishness or in separate councils.
225. Id. at 222 (Fabius, First Series, Letter VII).
226. See infra notes 227-38 and accompanying text.
227. The Amphictyonic Council (or "League," see Hutson, supra note 2, at 274) was
one of the Founders' favorite historical illustrations. See RICHARD, supra note 2, at 104-
05 (stating that the participants in the constitutional debates, particularly the Federalists,
"did not forget the Amphictyonic League... nor would they allow anyone else to do
so"). The League was organized around the temple of Apollo at Delphi; and while
primarily religious (a fact the Founders did not understand, id, it did have a few political
powers. OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY 54 (2d ed. 1970).
The League had two governing bodies: the ekklesia (assembly) and the
synedrion. In the latter, each tribe had two votes. Id. Professor E. Christian Kopff
argues that the Constitution's rules allocating two senators to each state likely was
inspired by the Amphictyonic synedrion. E. Christian Kopff, Open Shutters on the Past:
Rome and the Founders, in VITAL REMNANTS: AMERICA'S FOUNDING AND THE WESTERN
TRADITION 83 (Gary L. Gregg II ed., 1999).
228. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 197 (Fabius, First Series, Letter V).
229. Id.; see also id at 222-23 (Fabius, First Series, Letter VII).
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If folly or wickedness prevailed in any parts, friendly offices and
salutary measures restored tranquility. Thus the public good was
maintained.23°
Dickinson contended that the constitution of a good federation, like
other constitutions, promoted advantages and suppressed disadvantages:
"[T]he political Virtues of a Confederation suppresses the political Vices
,,231of a Confederation. In the sixth "Fabius" letter in the 1788 series,
Dickinson offered another positive historical case study: the Scottish
union with England.232 At length, he described the dire predictions some
Scots had made in advance of the union, but that, he said, all proved
false.233 According to Dickinson, the actual results of union had been the
cultivation of virtues and correction of errors; protection for the lower
classes; improvements in agriculture, science, arts, trade, and
manufactures; the rule of law; "peace and security at home, and
[i]ncrease[d] respectability abroad., 234 The Scottish Church and laws,
courts, and judicature all had remained established and secure.235
Dickinson argued that confederation on sound principles made all
236members stronger. In a good union as in the body, "A stroke, a touch
upon any part, will be immediately felt by the whole. 237 A diseased
member of the body severed from the rest could not recover, while one
that remains connected could be saved.238 The union between England
and Scotland had shown that "[t]he stock of their union or ingraftment, as
perhaps it may be called, being strong, [was] capable of drawing better
nutriment and in greater abundance, than they could ever have done
apart., 239 If, for example, sentiment for monarchy or aristocracy arose in
particular American states, confederation could protect the whole against
it: "[I]s not this a disorder in parts of the union, and ought it not to be
rectified by the rest? Is it reasonable to expect, that the disease will seize
all at the same time? If it is not, ought not the sound to possess a right
and power, by which they may prevent the infection from
spreading[?]
' 240
As for the United States under the Articles of Confederation-in
230. Id. at 223.
231. Hutson, supra note 2, at 278.





236. Id. at 249 (Fabius, First Series, Letter VIII).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 171 (Fabius, First Series, Letter II1).
239. ld. at 213 (Fabius, First Series, Letter VI).
240. Id. at 225 (Fabius, First Series, Letter VII).
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Dickinson's estimation it was, like the Amphictyonic League, a negative
model. The Articles had left the common power insufficient, and states
retained the power to hurt each other. Moreover, this inadequate
constitution actually contained incentives for states to act selfishly.
241Dickinson demonstrated the point in one of his more turgid passages,
which may be clarified thus:
There is severe civil unrest in Maryland. This civil unrest threatens
the state's tobacco crop. Using the requisition provisions of the
Articles, Congress asks the other states to contribute funds to assist
the Maryland authorities in restoring order. North Carolina considers
whether to honor the Congressional request. If North Carolina sends
aid, it incurs expenses. Especially if other states don't bear their part
of the burden, honoring Congressional demands could be costly for
North Carolina. Moreover, the civil unrest in Maryland really does
not threaten North Carolina. In fact, it benefits the latter state,
because a reduction of Maryland tobacco in the international market
will mean higher prices for North Carolina tobacco. Thus, the
incentives encourage North Carolina to reject the Congressional
request.
242
Thus, the Articles had created a dysfunctional institutional arrangement
that encouraged anti-social "free-riding.
243
Yet Dickinson also recognized that centralization could go too far.
Where there were no externalities, there was no reason for central
control.244 He affirmed that each member state should be sovereign in all
matters that related to that state only. 245  Writing in support of
ratification, Dickinson found it a source of satisfaction that under the
Constitution, "America is, and will be, divided into several sovereign
states, each possessing every power proper for governing within its own
limits for its own purposes, and also for acting as a member of the
union., 246 Any states that allowed the federal government to interfere in
their sovereign jurisdiction would be guilty of a breach of trust, for it was
241. The illustration in the text is based on the following passage: "Thus, while one
state should be relied upon by the union for giving aid, upon a recommendation of
Congress, to another in distress, the latter might be ruined; and the state relied upon,
might suppose, it would gain by such an event." Id. at 170 (Fabius, First Series, Letter
1ll).
242. Id.
243. The article that popularized for modem audiences how dysfunctional legal
institutions create anti-social incentives was, of course, Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of
Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
244. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 170-71 (Fabius, First Series, Letter
III).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 249 (Fabius, First Series, Letter VIII).
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the obligation of the "trustees or servants of the several states" to protect
from outside agents the power that citizens have placed in them.247
H. Summary of Dickinson's Political Thought
By way of summary, then, John Dickinson believed that
government was a collection of contributed rights or powers-powers
that, if exercised singly, could harm others. The contributed powers
should be administered in trust and impartially for the general welfare.
A constitution consisted of the rules by which those powers were
administered. To draft a good constitution, one must consult the lessons
of history. A good constitution would promote the general welfare by
encouraging good behavior and discouraging bad behavior. If the
constitution was to govern a confederation, it must set a proper balance
of contributed and retained rights. Tools employed by good constitutions
included:
1. retention by the people of certain fundamental rights;
2. alignment of public officials' interests with those of the
governed;
3. ultimate dependence by the main branches of government on an
independent citizenry;
4. independence of those branches from each other;
5. motivation and power in the branches to check each other; and
6. rules to discourage faction and turbulence.
IV. Philosophy in Action: John Dickinson at the
Constitutional Convention
A. Dickinson as a Resource
Some issues at the federal convention involved technical points of
law, finance, or history. As an expert in the first field and a person
tolerably knowledgeable in the other two, Dickinson often served as a
source of information and probing questions.248 When the question arose
as to whether an ex post facto law could be civil in nature or criminal
only, it was Dickinson who examined Blackstone's Commentaries and
reported back to the house that the term was criminal only249-a
247. id. at 171 (Fabius, First Series, Letter 111).
248. See infra Part IV.A.
249. 2 FARRAND, REcORDS, supra note 2, at 448-49 (Madison, Aug. 29).
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conclusion some thought incorrect.250 Dickinson and his former pupil
James Wilson informed the convention that the common law defined
felonies on the high seas.25  Dickinson insisted that the term "treason"
be delineated precisely to avoid abuse of the charge.252 He advocated
precision in the definition of "disability, ' '253 in the mode of election of
the President,254 and in the residence requirement for members of the
House of Representatives.255 He posed the question as whether the
existing Congress had to approve the new Constitution.256 He asked
what, if the Constitution were approved, the position would be of states
refusing to ratify.257  With Wilson, he queried whether the clause
specifying the allocation of Representatives 258 should include a reference
to direct taxes.259
250. Robert G. Natelson, Statutory Retroactivity: The Founders' View, 39 IDAHO L.
REV. 489, 517-22 (2003) (stating that prior to adoption of the Constitution it was unclear
whether ex post facto laws were criminal only, but concluding that the final constitutional
bargain was that they were).
251. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 316 (Madison, Aug. 17) (Dickinson
agreeing with Wilson).
252. Id. at 346 (Madison, Aug. 20). Madison wrote:
Mr Dickenson,[sic] thought the addition of "giving aid & comfort" unnecessary
& improper; being too vague and extending too far-He wished to know what
was meant by the "testimony of two witnesses", whether they were to be
witnesses to the same overt act or to different overt acts. He thought also that
proof of an overt act ought to be expressed as essential in the case.
Id.
253. Id. at 427 (Madison, Aug. 27) (successfully moving for postponement of
consideration because the term "disability" was too vague).
254. Id. at 515 (Madison, Sept. 5) ("Mr. Dickinson moved, in order to remove
ambiguity from the intention of the clause as explained by the vote, to add, after the
words 'if such number be a majority of the whole number of the Electors' the word
'appointed."') (The motion passed).
255. Id. at 218 (Madison, Aug. 8) ("Mr. Dickenson [sic] proposed <that it should
read> 'inhabitant actually resident for-year.' This would render the meaning less
indeterminate.").
256. Id. at 469 (Madison, Aug. 30) ("Mr. Dickinson asked whether the concurrence of
Congress is to be essential to the establishment of the system, whether the refusing States
in the Confederacy could be deserted-and whether Congress could concur in
contravening the system under which they acted?"); cf Hutson, supra note 2, at 282
(including the issue in his annotations to the report of the Committee of Detail, August 7,
1787).
257. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 469 (Madison, Aug. 30); cf Hutson,
supra note 2, at 282 (including the issue in his annotations to the report of the Committee
of Detail, August 7, 1787).
258. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
259. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 607-08 (Madison, Sept. 13):
Mr. Dickenson [sic] & Mr. Wilson moved to strike out "and direct taxes," from
sect. 2. art. I. as improperly placed in a clause relating merely to the
Constitution of the House of Representatives.
Mr. Govt. Morris. The insertion here was in consequence of what had passed
on this point; in order to exclude the appearance of counting the Negroes in the
Representation-The including of them may now be referred to the object of
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Dickinson's financial expertise likely proved useful when he served
as Delaware's representative on the Grand Committee of Eleven to
resolve the issue of federal assumption of state debts.260 He also served
on Judge Brearly's Committee of Eleven, created near the end of August
to fill in some of the Constitution's missing substance.26'
In the realm of history, Dickinson contributed some interesting
information relevant to the size of the Senate. Madison had argued that
the Senate should be kept small. He argued that as the number of Roman
tribunes grew, the college of tribunes as a whole lost influence because it
could no longer act with as much coolness and wisdom.262 Dickinson
demonstrated that the analogy was poorly chosen because the number of
tribunes never approached that of a legislative body: "If the reasoning of
(Mr. <Madison>) was good it would prove that the number of the Senate
ought to be reduced below ten, the highest no. of the Tribunitial
corps. 2 6 3
B. Dickinson as a Problem Solver
Dickinson's more significant contributions to the convention lay in
his role in solving problems that had to be overcome before the new
Constitution could be viable. The first of these was the distribution of
powers between central government and states. The second was the
composition and powers of the federal legislature. The third was the
composition and powers of the executive, and the fourth was the
composition and powers of the judiciary. In addition, he contributed to
the resolution of several more peripheral issues. These included the
scope of Congress's financial powers, the integrity of state boundaries,
voter qualifications, and the slave trade. His influence on the resolution
of the last two was small. On the integrity of state boundaries, his
influence was significant; on the scope of financial powers, it probably
was decisive.
Historian Forrest McDonald has pointed out that most of the
convention delegates used sources and principles eclectically to support
direct taxes, and incidentally only to that of Representation-
On the motion to strike out "and direct taxes" from this place
N- H- no- Mas- no- Ct. no. N- J- ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md ay. Va.
no- N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [Ayes-3; noes - 8].
Id.
260. Id. at 328 (Madison, Aug. 18) (listing those appointed to the Grand Committee
of Eleven).
261. Id. at 473 (Journal, Aug. 31) (listing those appointed to Judge Brearly's
Committee of Eleven).
262. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 151 (Madison, June 7).
263. Id. at 153 (Madison, June 7). Dickinson's notes for undelivered convention
speeches are also replete with classical references. Hutson, supra note 2, at 274, 277-78.
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the needs of the moment.2  I think the following discussion will show
that, with respect to principles, that was not true of John Dickinson. The
convention records reveal that, while he acted as a small-state partisan in
some ways,265 on several occasions he took positions adverse to small-
state interests. For example, during the battle over apportionment of
representation in the new legislature, Dickinson refused to back the
small-state sponsored New Jersey Plan.2 66 Instead, he proposed a
balance between it and the Virginia Plan,267 thereby disregarding
instructions from the Delaware legislature not to consent to changes in
the congressional one-state one-vote rule.268 Shortly thereafter, he
offered compromise language to define the scope of the convention's
mission.269 (His procedural motion passed, but he lost a substantive vote
the next day.)270 Later in the convention, he promoted a larger role for
the House of Representatives in treaty making, even though, as he noted,
keeping the process in the Senate alone would have strengthened the
smaller states.271  Dickinson's political principles tend to explain his
264. See generally MCDONALD, supra note 1.
265. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 456 (Madison, Aug. 29)
(opposing the guarantee that states not be broken up without their consent-a guarantee
of most importance to large states: "Mr Dickinson hoped the article would not be agreed
to. He dwelt on the impropriety of requiring the small States to secure the large ones in
their extensive claims of territory"); id at 465 (Madison, Aug. 30) (successfully moving
for a guarantee important to smaller states: "Nor shall... any State be formed by the
junction of two or more States or parts thereof, without the consent of the Legislatures of
such States, as well as of the Legislature of the U. States").
266. For his objections to the New Jersey Plan, see Hutson, supra note 2, at 270. See
also id. at 258 (noting Dickinson's disagreement with major parts of the Plan).
267. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 281 (Journal, June 18); id. at 327 (Yates,
June 18).
268. 3 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 574-75; see also id. at 575 n.6 (quoting a
letter of January 17, 1787 from George Read to John Dickinson); id. at 24-26 (quoting a
letter of May 21, 1787 from George Read to John Dickinson).
269. 1 FARRAND, RECoRDs, supra note 2, at 281 (Journal, June 18) ("Resolved that
the articles of confederation ought to be revised and amended, so as to render the
government of the United States adequate to the Exigencies, the preservation, and the
prosperity of the Union.").
Dickinson's handwritten notes reveal several of his efforts at compromise.
Hutson, supra note 2, at 270 (stating that both large and small states have "something to
part with"), 272 ("Let the Property of the larger states be secured. Let the Property and
Liberty of the lesser be also secured. Let Neither dictate to the other."), 275 ("neither
great states to dictate to smaller ones nor smaller ones to great ones").
270. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 312-13 (Journal, June 19).
271. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 393 (Madison, Aug. 23) ("Mr. Dickinson
concurred in the amendment, as most safe and proper, tho' he was sensible it was
unfavorable to the little States; wch would otherwise have an equal share in making
Treaties."). For another example of Dickinson's independence of small-state interests,
see id at 513 (Madison, Sept. 5) (favoring, in the event the electoral college did not give
a majority to any candidate, "giving the eventual election to the Legislature, instead of
the Senate," although the convention already had decided to give equal representation to
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actions more reliably than his personal interest or the interest of the state
he represented.
C. The Distribution of Power Between Federal Government and States
Early in the federal convention, the momentum was towards
national centralization. The Virginia Plan, which was the basis for early
discussions, was highly centralized. Under its provisions the states
would have survived, but only as "corporations"-fulfilling the
subordinate role that local government played in England.272 Gouverneur
Morris argued that in some cases the states ought not have the power to
govern their internal affairs.273 Alexander Hamilton presented a scheme
that would have given Congress the power to enact any legislation
whatsoever.274 Dickinson's friend and fellow Delaware delegate, George
Read, suggested abolishing the states entirely.275  It was in this
atmosphere that Dickinson arose on June 2 to champion his idea of
federalism:
A House of Nobles was essential to such a [balanced] Govt. Could
these be created by a breath, or by a stroke of the pen? No. They
were the growth of ages, and could only arise under a complication of
circumstances none of which existed in this Country. But though a
form the most perfect perhaps in itself be unattainable, we must not
despair. If antient [sic] republics have been found to flourish for a
moment only & then vanish forever, it only proves that they were
badly constituted; and that we ought to seek for every remedy for
their diseases. One of these remedies he conceived to be the
accidental lucky division of this country into distinct States; a
division which some seemed desirous to abolish altogether.
276
In other words, Dickinson was suggesting that the states, which the
majority of delegates thus far had considered mostly a nuisance, could
inject into the new American system the same sort of balance that
baronies provided in English government. The pre-existing fact of state
governments could be turned to positive advantage. His ideas paralleled
Madison's insofar as Dickinson proposed spreading government over a
wide area so as to render it more stable and less subject to faction.2 77 But
small states in the Senate).
272. Some anti-federalists later charged that this was exactly what the Constitution
would do. See, e.g., 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 277 ("American
Herald"); 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 638.
273. 2 FARRAND, REcoRDs, supra note 2, at 25-26 (Madison, July 17).
274. 1 FARRAND, REcoRDs supra note 2, at 291 (Madison, June 18).
275. Id. at 136 (Madison, June 6).
276. Id. at 87 (Madison, June 2).
277. See supra note 249.
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Dickinson's analysis was more complicated than Madison's. Madison's
Virginia Plan did not contemplate employing powerful states as
additional checks.278
Thus, on June 7, in response to the objection that he was trying to
unite distinct interests, Dickinson stated, "I do not consider this an
objection, Safety may flow from this variety of Interests-there exists
this Diversity in the constitution of G. Britain. We cannot abolish the
States and consolidate them into one Govt-Indeed if we could I shd. be
agt. it.
'279
Dickinson then produced two of the most colorful figures of speech
of the convention. As Madison reported it:
The preservation of the States in a certain degree of agency is
indispensable. It will produce that collision between the different
authorities which should be wished for in order to check each other.
To attempt to abolish the States altogether, would degrade the
Councils of our Country, would be impracticable, would be ruinous.
[Dickinson] compared the proposed National System to the Solar
System, in which the States were the planets, and ought to be left to
move freely in their proper orbits. The Gentleman from Pa. (Mr.
Wilson) wished he said to extinguish these planets. 28  If the State
Governments were excluded from all agency in the national one, and
all power drawn from the people at large, the consequence would be
that the national Govt. would move in the same direction as the State
Govts. now do, and would run into all the same mischiefs. The
reform would only unite the 13 small streams into one great current
pursuing the same course without any opposition whatever. 281
Dickinson got the solar system simile straight from Francis Bacon.282
However, Madison's summary of Dickinson's remarks does not capture
one aspect of the simile that Rufus King's notes reveal: "Let our Govt.
be like that of the solar System; let the Genl. Govt. be the Sun and the
States the Planets repelled yet attracted ... ,,283 The two independent
278. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 182 (Fabius, First Series, Letter VI)
(praising the Constitution by asking, "Where was there ever and where is there now upon
the face of the earth, a government so diversified and so attempered?").
279. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 158-59 (King, June 7).
280. Actually, he had not.
281. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 152-53 (Madison, June 7); see generally
id. at 156-57 (Yates, June 7). Yates apparently misunderstood the river analogy,
reporting that Dickinson had spoken of "the union of several small streams, would at last
form a respectable river, gently flowing to the sea," when what Dickinson was trying to
avoid was the creation of a torrent. See id.
Dickinson also compared the federal system to "A Father surrounded by a
Family of hearty, affectionate strong sons." Hutson, supra note 2, at 278.
282. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
283. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 159. For a modem use of the same figure
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levels of government would both repel and attract each other, forming an
"attempered ' '284 whole. It was not a mere compromise; it was the perfect
answer to those who argued that a republic could govern only a small
285territory.
We previously have explored Dickinson's theory that confederation,
if properly structured, would maximize the strengths of the member
states while minimizing their weaknesses, all to the advantage of the
whole, and that for a confederation to be properly structured, each
member must yield the power to do others ill. 286 A good example of
Dickinson applying this theory in the convention occurred on September
12, when the delegates were considering whether to limit state powers to
levy inspection duties on imports.287  Dickinson favored federal
control.28 8 He stated, "Nothing will save States in the situation" of New
Hampshire, New Jersey, and Delaware-states with only lesser ports-
"from being oppressed by their Neighbors, but requiring the assent of
Congress to inspection duties.,
289
On the other hand, when it came to the militia, Dickinson favored
state governance. Dickinson always had favored use of a militia in
preference to standing armies.29° Here the risk was an overreaching
federal government; state control over the militia would serve as an
obstacle to federal tyranny. 29 1 By rendering a large federal military
establishment less likely, reliance on the militia would check the desire
for empire:
The other fault [damaging to republics] of which, as yet, there are no
symptoms among us, is the thirst of empire. This is a vice, that ever
has been, and from the nature of things, ever must be, fatal to
republican forms of government. Our wants, are sources of
happiness our desires, of misery. The abuse of prosperity, is
of speech in discussing prospective European Federalism, see the comments by Nobel
Laureate political economist John Buchanan. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD A.
MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC CHOICE: Two CONTRASTING VISIONS OF THE
STATE 182-83 (1999).
284. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 182 (Fabius, First Series, Letter
VI).
285. Id. at 247 (Fabius, First Series, Letter VIII).
286. See supra Part 11.G.
287. See 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 589 (Madison, Sept. 12).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. See, e.g., London Letters, supra note 2, at 445, 448-49 (expressing disgust at the
British government's willingness to rely on mercenaries for defense rather than local
militia). For another example of traditional Whig dislike for standing armies, see 1
CATO, supra note 2, at 102.
291. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 247 (Fabius, First Series, Letter
Vill).
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rebellion against Heaven: and succeeds accordingly.
292
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Dickinson's contribution to
American federalism was not known until about twenty years ago, when
his convention notes were published. Among the notes is an outline of a
federal constitution.2 93 The Dickinson Plan, dated June 18, was prepared
during the period when Madison, Wilson, and other advocates of
"consolidation" held the initiative at the convention and were expressing
doubts about the practicality of enumerating Congressional powers.2 94
The Dickinson Plan responded to this skepticism by providing a detailed
enumeration. It is inconceivable that Dickinson did not share this draft,
or at least his ideas, with other delegates, and the hypothesis that he did
is supported by the fact that the enumeration is similar to, if shorter than,
the enumeration in Article I, Section 8 of the finished Constitution.295
Congressional powers on Dickinson's list include control over foreign
affairs; authority to levy imposts, excises, and other taxes; regulation of
foreign and interstate commerce; emission of money and regulation of
the alloy and value of coin; operation and profit from a postal service;
and creation of tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.
29 6
It comes as a surprise, therefore, that Dickinson agreed with
Madison on the need for a plenary federal veto of state laws. The
explanation appears to be Dickinson's belief that the Constitution should
allocate state and federal responsibilities according to the likelihood of
externalities from the exercise of state powers, and that a federal veto of
state laws seemed the most practicable way of preventing any state from
harming the others:
Mr. Dickenson [sic] deemed it impossible to draw a line between the
cases proper & improper for the exercise of the negative. We must
take our choice of two things. We must either subject the States to
the danger of being injured by the power of the Natl. Govt. or the
latter to the danger of being injured by that of the States. He thought
the danger greater from the States. To leave the power doubtful,
would be opening another spring of discord, and he was for shutting
292. Id. at 224 (Fabius, First Series, Letter VII). Dickinson suggested that federal
interference with the militia could be prevented by popular representation in the House of
Representatives and by "the mode of appointing the Senate." See 1 FARRAND, RECORDS,
supra note 2, at 172 (King, June 8).
293. Less and more finished versions of the Dickinson Plan are reproduced in Hutson,
supra note 2, at 264-69.
294. See, e.g., I FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 53 (Madison, May 31).
295. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
296. Hutson, supra note 2, at 265, 268; see also id at 270 (objecting to, in the outline
to his speech, indefinite grants of power to Congress).
[Vol. 108:2
HeinOnline  -- 108 Penn St. L. Rev. 456 2003-2004
2003] THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF JOHN DICKINSON 457
as many of them as possible.
297
This was early in the convention. Ultimately, the delegates
rendered the projected veto unnecessary by adopting the Supremacy
Clause.298
Because he generally stood athwart the centralizing trends of the
early weeks of the convention, some have depicted John Dickinson as a
states-rights advocate. Compared to nationalists like Wilson and
Hamilton, he was. Later in the process of drafting, ratification, and
amendment, however, the scope of federal powers was narrowed beyond
that demanded by Dickinson's externality theory. The final
constitutional settlement provided for a weaker federal government than
Dickinson had advocated, because some matters of interstate import were
left outside the immediate federal sphere.299 To the extent, nonetheless,
that they could be regulated by interstate compact, they were still subject
to the Congressional veto Dickinson had sought.300
D. Dickinson's Contributions to the Structure and Powers of Congress
At the Philadelphia convention, Dickinson was the leading promoter
of the election of Senators by the state legislatures. Madison reported
him as telling the convention on June 6:
Mr. Dickinson considered it as essential that one branch of the
Legislature shd. be drawn immediately from the people; and as
expedient that the other shd. be chosen by the Legislatures of the
States. 30  This combination of the State Govts. with the National
Govt. was as politic as it was unavoidable. In the formation of the
Senate we ought to carry it through such a refining process as will
assimilate it as near as may be to the House of Lords in England.
302
The following day, he again argued that the best "refining process"
for Senators was election by the state legislatures rather than popular
election in districts3°3 or election by the House of Representatives. 30 4 He
acknowledged that if the convention adopted his proposal but
apportioned the Senate by population, there would be a rather large upper
297. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 167 (Madison, June 8); see also id. at 172
(King, June 8); Hutson, supra note 2, at 268.
298. U.S. CONST. art. V1, cl. 2.
299. Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 2, at 489-93.
300. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
301. See also Hutson, supra note 2, at 264, 267.
302. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 136 (Madison, June 6).
303. Id. at 158 (Madison, June 7) (as proposed by James Wilson); see also id. at 149
(Joumal, June 7).
304. As proposed in the Virginia Plan. Id. at 20 (Madison, May 29).
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house, because each state would have to have at least one Senator.3 °5 He
was not troubled by this; on the contrary, he favored a large Senate
because he wanted to "assimilate it as near as may be to the House of
Lords," which at that time had a membership of about 208.306 According
to Madison's notes,
Mr. Dickenson [sic] had two reasons for his motion. 1. because the
sense of the States would be better collected through their
Governments; than immediately from the people at large. 2. because
he wished the Senate to consist of the most distinguished characters,
distinguished for their rank in life and their weight of property, and
bearing as strong a likeness to the British House of Lords as possible;
and he thought such characters more likely to be selected by the State
Legislatures, than in any other mode. The greatness of the number
was no objection with him. He hoped there would be 80 and twice
80. of them. If their number should be small, the popular branch
could not be [ba]lanced by them. The legislature of a numerous
people ought to be a numerous body.
307
Madison attacked the ideal of encouraging state influence in the
Senate; how, he wanted to know, could "family weight, as desired by Mr.
D.... be more certainly conveyed into the Senate through elections by
the State Legislatures, than in some other modes. 30 8  Moreover,
Madison continued, the states' irresponsible practices, such as issuing
paper money, had been a major reason for the calling of the
convention.30 9 If the state legislatures were irresponsible, then it was
contradictory to say that the national legislature would act like the state
legislatures unless checked, but that the state legislatures were the only
proper check.310
Of course, Madison was wrong, and the convention's decision to
305. Id.
306. A.S. TURBERVILLE, THE HOUSE OF LORDS IN THE AGE OF REFORM 1784-1837, at
478 (1958) (indicating that there were 208 peers in 1784).
307. 1 FARRAND, REcoRDs, supra note 2, at 150 (Madison, June 7). Compare Rufus
King's report:
First, that the mind & body of the State as such shd. be represented in the
national Legislature. Second, that the men of first Talents may be employed in
the national Legislature; they first will have a chance in the Election of the
people, failing there, wealth, family, or Talents may hold them up to the State
Legislatures as fit characters for the Senate-let their numbers be more than
200; by inlarging [sic] their Numbers you increase their consequence & weight
& by combining the families and wealth of the aristocracy, you establish a
balance that will check the Democracy-
See id. at 158-59; see also id. at 156-57 (Yates).
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adopt Dickinson's proposition was correct for the times. 31 I The benefits
of filtration do not necessarily depend on the independent merits of the
people doing the filtering. Even a venial legislature elected directly by
the people was likely to select better Senators than the people who had
elected that legislature. The proof was observed by Alexis de
Tocqueville several decades later:
On entering the House of Representatives at Washington, one is
struck by the vulgar demeanor of that great assembly. Often there is
not a distinguished man in the whole number ....
At a few yards' distance is the door of the Senate, which contains
within a small space a large proportion of the celebrated men of
America. Scarcely an individual is to be seen in it who has not had
an active and illustrious career: the Senate is composed of eloquent
advocates, distinguished generals, wise magistrates, and statesmen of
note, whose arguments would do honor to the most remarkable
parliamentary debates of Europe.
How comes this strange contrast. . . ? The only reason which
appears to me adequately to account for it is that the House of
Representatives is elected by the people directly, while the Senate is
elected by elected bodies.
3 12
Although the eventual decision of the convention to give each state
only two Senators resulted in a smaller assembly than Dickinson would
have liked, he later reconciled himself to that decision, and even
defended it.
3 13
In Dickinson's view, "refining" was not the only reason state
legislatures ought to elect Senators. While everyone else was thinking in
exclusively national or exclusively "foederal" [sic] (i.e., confederation)
terms, Dickinson was thinking of an entirely original blend-a
government that was both federal and national.3 14 This was, of course,
311. Id. at 148 (Journal) (adopted unanimously on June 7); see also id. at 156 (Yates);
id. at 408 (Madison) (confirmed by 9-2 vote on June 25).
312. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 211-12 (Henry Reeve &
Francis Bowen trans., 1945).
313. See infra notes 387-389 and accompanying text.
314. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 143 (King, June 6):
We cannot form a national Govt. as is proposed unless we draw a Br. from the
people, & a Br. from the legislatures-it is necessary in theory-And essential
to the success of the project-The objections to an election by the people arise
from the nature of a Free Government and are slight when compared with the
excellence of the Government-The 2d Br. must come from the State
sovereignties or Legislature, they will be more respectable and they must for yr
respectability & duration be something like the British House of peers-But
can one Br. be drawn from the Legislatures who are and have been opposed to
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what resulted; and Madison later recognized the importance of the
breakthrough by celebrating it in Federalist No. 39. One of America's
leading constitutional historians has given credit to Dickinson for
developing "an approach that was theoretically sound, practically sound,
and tailored to American realities .... Dickinson alone had perceived
that the United States already had institutional substitutes [for English
baronies] in the form of the individual states-which, in a manner of
speaking, were permanent and hereditary. 315
I already have observed that Dickinson believed different branches
of government should be independent of each other so they could
exercise unsullied judgment and compete freely with other branches for
popular favor.316 Congress under the Articles of Confederation had been
too dependent on the states. Dickinson was conscious that the same vice
might be attributed to his proposal for the Senate to be chosen by state
legislatures. So he suggested that "[t]he objection agst. making the
former dependent on the latter might be obviated by giving to the Senate
an authority permanent & irrevocable for three, five or seven years.
Being thus independent they will Speak & decide with becoming
freedom. 317 Of course, the ultimate solution of a six year term, without
explicit right of legislative recall,318 was very close to his proposal.
He promoted several other ideas to ensure Congressional
independence. He recommended that the salaries of Senators and
Representatives be paid by the central government rather than by the
states, 319 the view that ultimately prevailed. 320 During the discussion on
ye Genl. Govt. It can-the appointment of the Legisture [sic]. of the States, to
be in office 3 - 5 or 7 yrs; not subject to a recall and to depend on the Genl.
Govt. for yr. support ....
Id. Somewhat later in the convention, other delegates began to enunciate the view that
the union would be partly national and partly federal. See, e.g., id at 468 (Oliver
Ellsworth) (Madison, June 29), 474 (Yates, reporting the same statement by Ellsworth),
488 (Jonathan Davy) (Madison, June 30).
315. McDONALD, Novus, supra note 2, at 213, 215; see also Powell, supra note 2, at
9 ("One of the conspicuous states-rights leaders in the Convention, he was not
doctrinaire, and advocated at the same time a strong national government, which led him
in his thinking to the sort of compromise finally adopted.").
Robert Yates, in writing his convention notes, misunderstood Dickinson. 1
FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 141 ("Mr. Dickinson is for combining the state and
national legislatures in the same views and measures, and that this object can only be
effected by the national legislature flowing from the state legislatures.").
316. See supra notes 223-38 and accompanying text.
317. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 136 (Madison, June 6).
318. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
319. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 292 (Madison, Aug. 14):
Mr Dickenson [sic] took it for granted that all were convinced of the necessity
of making the Genl. Govt. independent of the prejudices, passions, and
improper views of the State Legislatures ..... He proposed that an Act should
be passed every 12 years by the Natl. Legislre [sic] settling the quantum of
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what was to become the Guarantee Clause,32' he opposed limiting federal
suppression of domestic violence to cases where the state legislature had
applied for relief. Defeated on this point, he successfully urged the
convention to allow federal intervention on application either of the state
legislature or the executive.322 He expressed reservations about judicial
review of Congressional acts because the court might use it as a pretext
for invading the legislative sphere.323
In addition to assuming the leading role in determining the method
of electing Senators, Dickinson also took a leading part in fixing the
apportionment of Senators. He was one of the first to promote (on June
2) the concept of a bicameral legislature with one house equally
apportioned among states.324  Had his view been accepted then, the
convention's proceedings would have moved along much faster.325 But
it was not accepted then, and the convention was to slog through weeks
of contention before finally arriving at the conclusion Dickinson had
suggested in the first place. During the delay, he incorporated his
proposal in the Dickinson Plan-not specifying how many Senators there
their wages. If the Genl. Govt. should be left dependent on the State
Legislatures, it would be happy for us if we had never met in this Room.
Id.
320. U.S. CONST. art I, § 6, cl. 1.
321. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
322. 2 FARRAND, REcORDs, supra note 2, at 466-67 (Madison, Aug. 30):
Mr. Dickinson moved to strike out "on the application of its Legislature
against" He thought it of essential importance to the tranquillity of the U- S.
that they should in all cases suppress domestic violence, which may proceed
from the State Legislature itself, or from disputes between the two branches
where such exist (Defeated 3-8)
Mr. Dickinson moved to insert the words, "or Executive" after the words
"application of its Legislature"-The occasion itself he remarked might hinder
the Legislature from meeting. On this question, N.H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N.J.
ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md divd. Va. no. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay. [Ayes-8;
noes-2; divided-I.]
Id.
323. Id. at 299 (Madison, Aug. 15):
Mr. Dickenson [sic] was strongly impressed with the remark of Mr. Mercer as
to the power of the Judges to set aside the law. He thought no such power
ought to exist. He was at the same time at a loss what expedient to substitute.
The Justiciary of Aragon he observed became by degrees the law-giver.
Id.
324. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 87 (Madison).
325. McDONALD, NovUs, supra note 2, at 280:
Early in the convention John Dickinson arose and wisely pointed out that the
delegates could save themselves a good deal of time and save their nerves a
good deal of wear by making the legislature bicameral, with representation
apportioned by population in one branch and with each state having one vote in
the other.
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were to be from each state, but only that each state would have an equal
vote. 326 Under that Plan, Senators would be selected for seven years,
with one-seventh of the group to turn over annually.
327
The convention's failure for so long to grasp the obvious must have
been frustrating to Dickinson. We have his notes for an oration never
delivered-notes that speak powerfully for equal representation in the
Senate.328 Even in scanty and unfinished form, they form a composition
of shining eloquence. 329 Their arguments include: (1) the danger that,
without equal apportionment in the upper house, large states would
oppress smaller ones; while (2) there was a corresponding lack of danger
to large states under his plan; (3) the clash of interests among states; (4)
the sacrifices made by smaller states in the Revolution and the loyalty
they had exhibited; and (5) the moral need to honor the compact of the
Articles of Confederation, for convenience could not justify breach of
faith.33°
With respect to the lower house of the new national legislature,
Dickinson's successes were more mixed. On June 2, he argued that he
''supposed the sums paid within each state would form a better ratio for
the other branch than either the number of inhabitants or the quantum of
326. Hutson, supra note 2, at 264, 267.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 272-79.
329. Id. A sample of Dickinson's rough notes:
What has N.J. done or neglected to do to merit this treatment. Overwhelmed
with hostile Armies, her people plundered, her towns burnt, her Matrons and
Virgins butchered. Did New Jersey falter. No. A mournful Monument of
human Virtues assailed yet faithful.
Thro[ugh] the little State of Delaware, the Army of the Enemy passed, while
her whole seaboard was exposed to the continual Hostilities of her naval forces
darting upon her wherever they pleased and not to be protected because the
points of attack were unknown, till the Injuries were committed. Weak as her
arm was yet did her Mind ever waver? No. All succor cut off. Held by the
Throat, swords incontinently pointed. She was ready and willing to be
sacrificed rather than renounce the Fate of her Country.
What pretense then for this Conduct to the smaller states. Is it necessary. I
hope what has been said on the first Head [i.e., topic] demonstrates that it is
not. Is Necessity a proper plea in the Mouths of those who are to gain by that
Plea. What did the Patriots of England think and say of such a Plea in the Days
of Charles the II. I will not repeat what they said. What did the patriots of
America say of this Plea in the Days of George the 3d. I need not repeat what
they said.
But it is perhaps convenient. Convenient for whom, for those who are to profit
by it? So are Tender Laws to Debtors and the Violation of Treaties to some
Individuals. But does this Convenience outweigh the Considerations for an
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property.",331  On June 1 1 he repeated the proposition. "By thus
connecting the interest of the States with their duty, the latter would be
sure to be performed., 332 As we have seen, this sort of connection of
interest and duty was very Dickinsonian. 333  The risk, he said, of
allocating representatives by population was that as western states were
admitted to the union, their inhabitants would become numerous, but
would likely be poor compared with those of the older states. 334 With
representation by population in the House, they could oppress the states
that paid the bills. 335 Obviously, Dickinson's arguments did not prevail.
Yet he did prevail in his defense of a traditional buttress of the
independence of the lower house: its exclusive right to initiate revenue
bills. This issue arose during the larger conflict over whether Senators
ought to be allocated by population or by state. To resolve that larger
conflict, a select committee submitted a compromise, reputed to have
originated from Benjamin Franklin, whereby the larger states conceded
equal representation in the Senate and the smaller conceded that the
House would have the exclusive power to initiate money bills. Some
delegates from larger states were dissatisfied with this proposal, arguing
that the exclusive right to initiate revenue measures really was of little
consequence.336 Dickinson disagreed:
Experience must be our only guide. Reason may mislead us. It was
not Reason that discovered the singular & admirable mechanism of
the English Constitution. It was not Reason that discovered or ever
could have discovered the odd & in the eye of those who are
governed by reason, the absurd mode of trial by Jury. Accidents
probably produced these discoveries, and experience has give a
sanction to them .... And has not experience verified the utility of
restraining money bills to the immediate representatives of the
people. Whence the effect may have proceeded he could not say;
whether from the respect with which this privilege inspired the other
branches of Govt. to the H. of Commons, or from the turn of thinking
it gave to the people at large with regard to their rights, but the effect
was visible & could not be doubted. Shall we oppose to this long
experience, the short experience of 11 years which we had ourselves,
331. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 87 (Madison). In recognition of the fact
that importing states would pay all the imposts and that states without good ports could
not collect imposts, Dickinson contemplated capping the ratio by which one state's
representation could outweigh another. Hutson, supra note 2, at 264, 267.
332. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 196 (Madison); see also id. at 205
(Yates); id. at 207 (Paterson, June 11). On Dickinson's preference for tying benefit to
obligation, see supra notes 189, 210, 211 and accompanying text.
333. See supra Part III.B.
334. Hutson, supra note 2, at 279; see also id at 262.
335. Id.; see also id. at 260-61.
336. See 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 278 (Madison, Aug. 13).
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on this subject... He observed that all the prejudices of the people
would be offended by refusing this exclusive privilege to the H. of
Repress. and these prejudices shd. never be disregarded by us when
no essential purpose was to be served. When this plan goes forth, it
will be attacked by the popular leaders. Aristocracy will be the
watchword; the Shibboleth among its adversaries. Eight States have
inserted in their Constitutions the exclusive right of originating
money bills in favor of the popular branch of the Legislature. Most
of them however allowed the other branch to amend. This he thought
would be proper for us to do.
3 3 7
This was an extraordinary speech for several reasons. It identified
the value of the right to originate money bills ("the respect with which
this privilege inspired the other branches of Govt. to the H. of
Commons").3 38 It also anticipated by three years Edmund Burke's great
pamphlet, Reflections on the Revolution in France, wherein Burke
observed that many wise institutions arise by historical accident 339 and
that constitutions must be grounded in the prejudices 340 and long-time
practices 341 of the people. Finally, it showed that Dickinson could be a
political prophet-for he predicted precisely the line Anti-Federalists
would take against the constitution ("aristocracy"),342  and wisely
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. See BURKE, supra note 2 ("If you are desirous of knowing the spirit of our
constitution and the policy which predominated in that great period which has secured it
to this hour, pray look for both in our histories, in our records, in our acts of parliament,
and journals of parliament.").
340. Burke wrote:
Many of our men of speculation, instead of exploding general prejudices,
employ their sagacity to discover the latent wisdom which prevails in them. If
they find what they seek, and they seldom fail, they think it more wise to
continue the prejudice, with the reason involved, than to cast away the coat of
prejudice and to leave nothing but the naked reason; because prejudice, with its
reason, has a motive to give action to that reason, and an affection which will
give it permanence. Prejudice is of ready application in the emergency; it
previously engages the mind in a steady course of wisdom and virtue and does
not leave the man hesitating in the moment of decision skeptical, puzzled, and
unresolved. Prejudice renders a man's virtue his habit, and not a series of
unconnected acts. Through just prejudice, his duty becomes a part of his
nature.
Id. Russell Kirk summarized Burke's view of prejudice in this manner: "[Burke]
knew . . . the mass of beliefs we often call 'prejudices' to be the moral sense of
humanity." RUSSELL KIRK, EDMuND BURKE: A GENIUS RECONSIDERED 152 (1967); cf id.
at 161-62 ("Only in a state governed by constitution, convention, and prescription can the
rights--or the aspirations of men be realized.").
341. See BURKE, supra note 2 ("[T]he time of prescription which, through long usage,
mellows into legality governments that were violent in their commencement.").
342. A great many examples of this charge appear in anti-federalist tracts. See, e.g.,
17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 52-56 ("An Old Whig," Letter VIII); 18
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cautioned against strengthening their case.343
E. Dickinson's Contributions to the Structure and Powers of the
Presidency
When the delegates' attention turned to the executive, Dickinson
again argued that ends should come before means.3" In his June 2
speech to the convention, he focused on the problem that he and his
fellow delegates, who personally had known only monarchy, would
encounter in creating a republican chief executive. 345  The executive
should be independent from the other branches. But hitherto executive
independence had been achieved only in limited monarchies. In
England, the executive's power was extensive; it arose from the
monarch's wide powers and from the "attachments which the Crown
draws to itself' 346-that is, the monarch's prestige as a national symbol
and his power of patronage, by which he could attach private citizens and
members of the House of Commons to the royal cause.347
In America, a monarchy was out of the question: "The spirit of the
times-the state of our affairs, forbade the experiment, if it were
desireable [sic]." 348 The convention's task, therefore, was to look for
institutional substitutes that would render a republican executive as
independent from the legislature and judiciary as the King was in
England.
Part of Dickinson's solution was to achieve "stability" among the
branches by weakening the powers opposing the executive.3 49 As in
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 5 ("The Federalist's Political Creed").
343. Some of his proposals were not so well thought out. At one point, he moved that
the Constitution require that the wages of the members of both houses be identical.
When it was pointed out that the duties of Senators would likely be more extensive than
those of Representatives, he withdrew the motion. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at
293 (Madison, Aug. 14).
344. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 74 (Pierce, June 1) ("Mr. Dickinson was
of opinion that the powers of the Executive ought to be defined before we say in whom
the power shall vest."). This speech, like Dickinson's earlier comment on the legislature,
also went unreported by Madison.
345. Id. at 86 (Madison). The speech is not well reported, and the discussion in the
text makes limited use of inference.
346. Id.
347. Whigs described the Crown's ability to influence members of Parliament with
pensions and sinecures as "corruption." American distaste for the practice is reflected in
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 2 ("No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United
States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been
encreased [sic] during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.").
348. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 87 (Madison).
349. Hutson, supra note 2, at 264, 269.
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England, the legislature would be divided into two branches, and both
branches would be less formidable than their British counterparts.
350
Membership in the House of Lords was hereditary and for life terms, but
the Senate would be elective and chosen only for fixed terms, with
regular rotation.351 Members of the House of Commons served for seven
years, but members of the House of Representatives would serve for a
much shorter period; Dickinson proposed three years, with annual
rotation.352 Parliament's power was plenary throughout the realm;
Congress would be limited by the reservation of much authority in the
states.353 In Britain, the constitutional balance among the branches of
government was akin to the equilibrium among three (or four) iron rods
opposing each other teepee-style. In America the delegates could
achieve the same balance with light wooden poles.354
Throughout the convention, Dickinson generally took the side of a
firm, independent executive.355 In his view, America could achieve this
best with a plural executive.356 He contemplated three officers, serving
for seven-year, staggered terms.357 The authors of the Virginia Plan had
suggested that Congress elect the executive, 358 assuring its independence
by denying re-eligibility.359 Dickinson, as unsure of how to elect the
executive as most other delegates were, initially supported, then backed
away from this idea.360 He also opposed election by the state legislatures
350. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 86 (Madison); Hutson, supra note 2, at
264, 267.
351. Hutson, supra note 2, at 264, 267 (seven years, with annual rotation).
352. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 360-61 (Madison, June 21); Hutson,
supra note 2, at 264, 267.
353. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 86 (Madison, June 2) ("One source of
stability is the double branch of the Legislature. The division of the Country into distinct
States formed the other principal source of stability. This division ought therefore to be
maintained, and considerable powers to be left with the States.").
354. This dreadful metaphor is mine, not Dickinson's.
On Dickinson's desire to replicate the balance of the British Constitution, see
WOOD, supra note 2, at 554. In Fabius, First Series, Letter IX, he discussed the lighter
weight of the American constitutional poles, noting that the House of Representatives
was far more democratic than House of Commons, the President much more restricted in
power than the King, and twenty-six senators far less dangerous than a "hereditary
aristocratic body, consisting of many hundreds, possessed of immense wealth in lands
and money, strengthened by a host of dependents, and who availing themselves of defects
in the constitution, send many of these into the house of commons; who hold a third part
of the legislative power in their own hands; and who form the highest court of judicature
in the nation." 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 262.
355. Hutson, supra note 2, at 264, 269.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 21 (Madison, May 29).
359. Id.
360. Hutson, supra note 2, at 266 (legislature to elect executive), 269 (legislature
elects executive by two-thirds vote).
[Vol. 108:2
HeinOnline  -- 108 Penn St. L. Rev. 466 2003-2004
2003] THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF JOHN DICKINSON 467
or governors:
361
He had long leaned towards an election by the people which he
regarded as the best and purest source. Objections he was aware lay
agst this mode, but not so great he thought as agst the other modes.
The greatest difficulty in the opinion of the House seemed to arise
from the partiality of the States to their respective Citizens. But,
might not this very partiality be turned to a useful purpose. Let the
people of each State chuse [sic] its best Citizen. The people will
know the most eminent characters of their own States, and the people
of different States will feel an emulation in selecting those of which
they will have the greatest reason to be proud--Out of the thirteen
names thus selected, an Executive Magistrate may be chosen either
by the Natil Legislature, or by Electors appointed by it.
3 62
This passage is vintage Dickinson: an instinct toward popular
government, but a way to institute it that would turn its vice-
partiality-to good purpose.36 3
Dickinson favored limiting the legislature's power to remove the
executive to impeachment for cause or in response to an application by a
majority of state legislatures 364 (later governors). 365  He successfully
suggested a measure that may have expanded the President's power to
appoint executive officers.366
Two of Dickinson's positions at the convention may seem at first
glance to be contradictory, but actually were complementary. These
were (1) his opposition to veto or revision of laws by a revisionary
council, and (2) his support for an executive council, once it had become
clear that the chief executive would be unitary. A revisionary council
was a committee of executive officers (including the chief executive and
one or more judges) that could veto or recommend changes in bills the
361. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 114 (Madison, July 25).
362. Id. at 114-15.
363. Cf. supra Part I11.B.
364. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 85 (Madison, June 2). According to
Robert Yates, when this idea was rejected, Dickinson submitted, and the convention
adopted, wording that authorized Congress to impeach for "cause." Id. at 89-90 ("Mr.
Dickinson moved that in the seventh resolution, the words, and removable on
impeachment and conviction for malconduct or neglect in the execution of his office,
should be inserted after the words ineligible a second time. Agreed to."). However, both
Madison's notes and the official journal state that Hugh Williamson of North Carolina
made this motion. Id. at 78 (Journal), 88 (Madison). The official journal shows
Delaware as voting "no" on the measure. Id. at 79.
365. Hutson, supra note 2, at 269.
366. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 405 (Madison, Aug. 24) ("Mr. Dickinson
moved to strike out the words 'and shall appoint to offices in all cases not otherwise
provided for by this Constitution' and insert-'and shall appoint to all offices established
by this Constitution, except in cases herein otherwise provided for, and to all offices
which may hereafter be created by law"'); see also Hutson, supra note 2, at 281.
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legislature had passed. Under the then-existing constitution of New
York, for example, the council consisted of the governor, the chancellor,
and the justices of the state supreme court.367 One could find support for
this approach in the pages of Dickinson's favorite author, Francis
Bacon.368
Bacon, however, had lived under a monarchy, and Dickinson
concluded that a republican executive needed the additional prop of sole
exercise of the veto power.369 Moreover, he thought that adding judges
to the veto process would mix improperly the judicial and executive
powers. 370  Although Dickinson was dubious about judicial review of
laws on constitutional grounds,371 when all was said and done he
apparently considered it a superior alternative to a revisionary council.372
An executive council differed from a revisionary council in that it
consisted only of executive branch officers.3 73 Thus, an executive
council preserved separation of powers. 374 Presidential decision making
would be better and more supportable if it were the product of
deliberation.375 No doubt the President would deliberate with other
executive branch officials even if there were no council; however, the
fact that those officials were dependent on the President for their offices
might induce them to be less candid than they otherwise might be.376 In
any case, their dependence might cloud their judgment.377  Council
367. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. III, available at The Avalon Project at Yale Law
School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/ny0l.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
368. BACON, supra note 2, at 288 (writing, "Judges should consult with kings and
[e]states when a consideration of state intervenes in law. Estates and kings should
consult with judges when a matter of law intervenes in business of state").
369. Hutson, supra note 2, at 266, 269. In Dickinson's Plan, as in the finished
constitution, the veto would have been subject to a two-thirds override. Id.
370. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 140 (Madison, June 6) ("Mr. Dickinson.
Secrecy, vigor & dispatch are not the principal properties reqd. in the Executive.
Important as these are, that of responsibility is more so, which can only be preserved; by
leaving it singly to discharge its functions. He thought too a junction of the Judiciary to
it, involved an improper mixture of powers."); see also id at 108-09 (King, June 4)
("Dickerson [sic]-agt. It-you must separate the Leg. Jud. & Ex-but you propose to
give the Executive a share in Legislation-why not the Judicial-There is a Difference-
the Judges must interpret the Laws they ought not to be legislators. The Executive is
merely ministerial-besides we have Experience in the British Constitution of the
Executive's having a negative-.").
371. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 298 (Madison, Aug. 15).




375. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 542 (Madison, Sept. 7) ("Mr. Dickinson
was for a Council. It wd. be a singular thing if the measures of the Executive were not to
undergo some previous discussion before the President.").
376. See id.
377. On the Founders' belief in how dependence clouds judgment, see Natelson,
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members would owe their appointment to other sources, perhaps the
legislature.378
Assent of a council could increase the public acceptance of
executive decisions. In crafting his own plan for a constitution,
Dickinson obviously had this in mind, for he provided that each
executive officer was responsible for all decisions unless he had
dissented in writing.379  Giving the executive more legitimacy was a
priority, for in the colonies the executive power had been intrusive, but
brittle.38° "Swollen claims and shrunken powers, especially when they
occur together, are always a source of trouble.
3 81
Of course, Dickinson's preference for an executive council was not
the product of abstract speculation. Both as president of Delaware and as
president as Pennsylvania, he had operated through such councils. 382 In
each case, the council members had been selected so as to leave them
independent of the president.
383
The finished constitution did not create an executive council per se,
but Dickinson thought he had obtained a good substitute in the Senate.
In truth, that body shared certain characteristics with the executive
councils of Delaware and Pennsylvania. It was relatively small and
elected for staggered terms.384 It was associated with the executive in the
appointment process.385 It had an "advice and consent" function.386 Like
Sympathy and Independence, supra note 2, at 384-85.
378. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 329 (Madison, Aug. 18) ("Mr. Dickenson
[sic] urged that the great [i.e., council] appointments should be made by the Legislature,
in which case they might properly be consulted by the Executive-but not if made by the
Executive himself.").
379. Hutson, supra note 2, at 266, 269.
380. BAILYN, supra note 2, at 66-96.
381. Id. at 96.
382. See infra note 383 and accompanying text.
383. In Delaware, each house of the legislature elected two members of the privy
council for fixed terms, who then lost their legislative seats. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 8,
available at The Avalon Project at Yale Law School,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/de02.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2003). In
Pennsylvania, the members of the executive council were elected by voters in districts,
also for fixed terms. PA. CONST. of 1776, § 19, available at The Avalon Project at Yale
Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/pa08.htm (last visited Aug. 1,
2003).
384. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 3, cl. 2; cf DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 8, available at The
Avalon Project at Yale Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/de02.htm
(last visited Aug. 1, 2003) (staggered two year terms); PA. CONST. of 1776, § 19,
available at The Avalon Project at Yale Law School,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/pa08.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2003)
(staggered three year terms).
385. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; cf. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 12, available at The
Avalon Project at Yale Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/de02.htm
(last visited Aug. 1, 2003); PA. CONST. of 1776, § 20, available at The Avalon Project at
Yale Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/pa08.htm (last visited Aug.
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the Pennsylvania council, it tried impeachments. 387
So it is understandable that although Dickinson would have
preferred a large upper house, during the ratification process he defended
the decision for a small one.388 Rebutting claims that the Senate would
be an aristocratic body, he wrote, "One could really have supposed that
the smallness of numbers could not be termed a cause of danger, as
influence must encrease [sic] with an enlargement [as in the House of
Lords]., 389 Perhaps this was just Dickinson making a case, 390 but one
might as well have concluded that in losing his large upper house he had
gained a small assembly with significant executive and consultative
powers, and appointed so as to be thoroughly independent of the
President. Very much like the council he had sought.391
One last point on the executive: All of the methods I have
mentioned for assuring executive independence complied with the
principle of separation of powers. However, Dickinson, like other
Founders, subordinated that principle to the principle of independence.
In other words, they were willing to blur powers if necessary to secure to
one branch independence from the others. The premier example was
executive veto. This was essentially a legislative power, but Dickinson
supported giving it to the President for his protection.392
F. Dickinson 's Contributions to the Structure and Powers of the
Federal Judiciary
At the constitutional convention, Dickinson worked toward a firm
federal judiciary, independent of the states and of other branches of
government. John Rutledge of South Carolina argued that the federal
government needed only a supreme court, and moved that inferior
1,2003).
386. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2; cf DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 9, available at The Avalon
Project at Yale Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/de02.htm (last
visited Aug. 1, 2003); PA. CONST. of 1776, § 20, available at The Avalon Project at Yale
Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/pa08.htm (last visited Aug. 1,
2003).
387. PA. CONST. of 1776, § 20, available at The Avalon Project at Yale Law School,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/pa08.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2003).
388. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 122 (Fabius, First Series, Letter II).
389. Id.
390. He still seemed to have had some regrets; he made a point of the weakness of the
Senate by reason of it being overawed by the numbers of the House. He added that
proper representation in the upper house is unattainable, but is the source of some
objections to the system. Id. at 125.
391. Cf id.
392. Hutson, supra note 2, at 266, 269. On the use of "blurring" of powers to assure
independence, see Natelson, Sympathy and Independence, supra note 2, at 400-01.
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tribunals be left in state hands.393 Dickinson contended "strongly that if
there was to be a National Legislature, there ought to be a national
Judiciary, and that the former ought to have authority to institute the
latter., 394 Rutledge's motion was defeated, five states to four.395 Wilson
and Madison then moved for acceptance of Dickinson's idea that
Congress have the right (although not the duty) to establish tribunals
inferior to the Supreme Court.39 6  This passed, eight to two, with one
state divided.39 7
Just as Dickinson opposed permitting Congress to remove a
President without cause, he also opposed allowing Congress
untrammeled power to remove judges.398 Instead, he would have
required the concurrence of both President and Congress. 399 On this
point, he lost.400 He was successful, however, in his motion to grant the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction of fact as well as law.40'
G. Dickinson's Contributions on Other Issues
John Dickinson was involved less prominently in several other
issues at the convention. These included defining the scope of
Congress's financial powers, establishing the rules by which states could
be divided and combined, setting property qualifications for voting and
for federal office, and limiting the slave trade.
1. Congress's Financial Powers
Dickinson's trust theory of government urged him to seek
limitations on federal authority to reduce the chances that government
power would be used for purely local or "partial" benefits. When
drafting the Articles of Confederation, he had included provisions
limiting Congressional powers to those that would serve the "general
welfare" rather than the interests of particular states, sections, or
factions.40 2  Thus, his draft of the Articles provided a statement of
393. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 124 (Madison, June 5).
394. ld. at 125; see also Hutson, supra note 2, at 266, 269.
395. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 125 (Madison, June 5).
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. See 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 428-29 (Madison, Aug. 27).
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 431; cf U.S. CONST. art. I1l, § 2, cl. 2 ("In all the other Cases before
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact,
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.").
402. The General Welfare Clause was intended to be a limitation on Congress's
financial power rather than a grant of power. On this subject, see Natelson, General
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purpose to the effect that, "The said Colonies unite themselves... for
their common Defence, the Security of their Liberties, and their mutual
and general Welfare. 4 °3 This document would authorize spending of
money only "for the common Defence, or general Welfare. ' ' 4
Purchases of Indian lands40 5 and disposition of lands40 6 could occur only
for the "general Benefit."
At the constitutional convention on August 6, the Committee of
Detail presented to the convention a draft constitution embodying the
delegates' agreements thus far.407 The draft did not limit federal taxing
or spending to general welfare purposes, nor did it restrict spending to
appropriations authorized by Congress.40 8  Dickinson's handwritten
annotations to this document include the following suggestion: "no
Preference or Advantage to be given to any persons or places-Laws to
be equal.., no money to be drawn out of the National Treasury, unless
by an appropriation thereof by Law. ' 4° 9
Later in August, Dickinson served on a Committee of Eleven
chaired by William Livingston.410 Although we do not have records of
that committee's deliberations, we do know that it proposed adding a
general welfare limitation to the financial powers of Congress.41
Similarly, on September 4, another Committee of Eleven, headed by
Judge David Brearley, and also including Dickinson,412 recommended
adding to the Taxation Clause the specific phrase, "to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare., 413  This, of
course, is the wording we now call the General Welfare Clause.4 14 The
Brearly Committee further recommended adding the Appropriation
Clause that Dickinson had suggested in his notes.415 Thus, while it is
always possible that Dickinson simply had written down someone else's
suggestions, given his long association with the "general welfare"
concept and his presence on both committees, we probably can credit
Welfare Clause, supra note 2.
403. Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union; July 12, 1776, art. II, The
Avalon Project at Yale Law School, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/contcong/07-12-76.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2003).
404. Id. at art. XI.
405. Id. at art. XIV.
406. Id. at art. XVIll.
407. Hutson, supra note 2, at 281.
408. See id.
409. Id.
410. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 328 (Madison, Aug. 18).
411. Id. at 352 (Journal, Aug. 21).
412. Id. at 473 (Journal, Aug. 31).
413. Id. at 493 (Journal, Sept. 4).
414. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
415. 2 FARRAND, REcORDs, supra note 2, at 505 (Journal, Sept. 5).
[Vol. 108:2
HeinOnline  -- 108 Penn St. L. Rev. 472 2003-2004
2003] THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF JOHN DICKINSON 473
Dickinson as the delegate most responsible for adding the General
Welfare Clause. He may also have been the delegate most responsible
for inserting the Appropriation Clause. 16
2. Integrity of State Boundaries
The draft constitution prepared by the Committee of Detail included
language requiring, before a state could be broken into smaller states,
that the legislature of the original state consent.417 Several larger states
included within their asserted boundaries substantial land claims, such as
New York's claim to Vermont.418  On the other hand, some smaller
states-such as Delaware and Maryland-enjoyed no such claims, and
argued that the territory involved should be carved into new states. 19
On August 29, Dickinson and representatives of the claim-less
states of Maryland and New Hampshire argued that state legislative
consent ought not be necessary for the creation of new states within
asserted boundaries. 420 Dickinson "dwelt on the impropriety of requiring
the small States to secure the large ones in their extensive claims of
territory.,, 42 The following day, however, the convention voted to retain
the provision, eight states to three.422
Dickinson accordingly decided that he might at least win a
counterbalancing protection for the smaller states-that they not be
combined with others without their consent. He therefore moved, "Nor
shall any State be formed by the junction of two or more States or parts
thereof, without the consent of the Legislatures of such States, as well as
of the Legislature of the U. States., 423  This was agreed to without
dissent,424 and its substance became part of the finished Constitution.
4 25
416. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.").
417. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 188 (Madison, Aug. 6).
418. See id.
419. See id.
420. Id. at 456 (Madison, Aug. 29).
421. Id.
422. Id. at 464 (Madison, Aug. 30).
423. Id. at 465.
424. Id.
425. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. Section 3 reads:
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State
shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any
State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States,
without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the
Congress.
HeinOnline  -- 108 Penn St. L. Rev. 473 2003-2004
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
3. Independence of Citizens
Like virtually all the other Founders, Dickinson believed that for
citizens to participate in public life with unclouded judgment, they
needed to possess independent means.426 Accordingly, Dickinson urged
the convention to limit the franchise to freeholders.427 Characteristically,
he urged as a reason his perception of an identity of interest between
freeholders and the general public.428
He also shared the dominant view that officeholders should be
dependent on the people,429 which may be one reason he opposed George
Mason's insistence that officeholders be subject to property
qualifications. 430  He did say that there ought to be no excessive
426. See supra notes 218-22 and accompanying text.
427. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 202 (Madison, Aug. 7):
Mr. Dickenson [sic] had a very different idea of the tendency of vesting the
right of suffrage in the freeholders of the Country. He considered them as the
best guardians of liberty; And the restriction of the right to them as a necessary
defence agst. the dangerous influence of those multitudes without property &
without principle, with which our Country like all others, will in time abound.
As to the unpopularity of the innovation it was in his opinion chemirical [sic].
The great mass of our Citizens is composed at this time of freeholders, and will
be pleased with it.
Id.; see also id at 207 (King, Aug. 7).
The franchise was limited to freeholders in Delaware. DEL. CONST. of 1776, arts. 3, 4,
available at The Avalon Project at Yale Law School,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/de02.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2003).
428. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 209 (McHenry, Aug. 7):
Mr. Dickinson contended for confining the rights of election in the first branch
to free holders. No one could be considered as having an interest in the
government unless he possessed some of the soil.
The fear of an aristocracy was a theoretical fiction. The owners of the soil
could have no interest distinct from the country. There was no reason to dread
a few men becoming lords of such an extent of territory as to enable them to
govern at their pleasure.
Id. (emphasis added).
429. He did not, however, favor extending the state system of annual elections to the
federal government from prudential considerations:
Mr. Dickenson [sic]. The idea of annual elections was borrowed from the
antient [sic] usage of England, a country much less extensive than ours. He
supposed biennial would be inconvenient. He preferred triennial: and in order
to prevent the inconveniency of an entire change of the whole number at the
same moment, suggested a rotation, by an annual election of one third.
I FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 360-61 (Madison, June 21); see also id at 365
(Yates).
430. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 2, at 123 (Madison, July 26):
Mr. Dickenson [sic] was agst. any recital of qualifications in the Constitution. It
was impossible to make a compleat [sic] one, and a partial one would by
implication tie up the hands of the Legislature from supplying the omissions.
The best defence lay in the freeholders who were to elect the Legislature.
Whilst this Source should remain pure, the public interest would be safe. If it
ever should be corrupt, no little expedients would repel the danger.
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veneration of wealth in a republic. 43' Of course, requiring voters to be
freeholders was not an "excessive veneration of wealth" because, as he
pointed out, "The great mass of our Citizens is composed at this time of
freeholders. 432 In any event, the convention left voting qualifications to
the states,433 and did not adopt a property requirement for public office.
4. The Slave Trade
Dickinson was not a highly observant Quaker, but he took his
religion seriously enough to induce him to oppose slavery and to
manumit his own slaves.434 His notes for an undelivered speech
composed in July show him opposing the three-fifths rule, 435 both for the
reason that it was shameful and because it created the wrong incentives;
states that imported slaves would benefit from increased representation
in Congress. On the floor, he opposed the slave trade on "general
welfare" grounds:
Mr. Dickenson [sic] considered it as inadmissible on every principle
of honor & safety that the importation of slaves should be authorized
to the States by the Constitution. The true question was whether the
national happiness would be promoted or impeded by the
importation, and this question ought to be left to the National Govt.
not to the States particularly interested. If Engd. & France permit
slavery, slaves are at the same time excluded from both those
Kingdoms. Greece and Rome were made unhappy by their slaves.
He could not believe that the Southn. States would refuse to
confederate on the account apprehended; especially as the power was
not likely to be immediately exercised by the Genl. Government.
436
That was August 7.437 On August 25, recognizing the fact that the
Constitution would authorize the continuation of the slave trade until
1808, he urged limiting that extension to those states that had not already
Id.
431. Id. at 123 (Madison, July 26):
He doubted the policy of interweaving into a Republican constitution a
veneration for wealth. He had always understood that a veneration for poverty
& virtue, were the objects of republican encouragement. It seemed improper
that any man of merit should be subjected to disabilities in a Republic where
merit was understood to form the great title to public trust, honors & rewards.
Id.
432. Id. at 202 (Madison, Aug. 7).
433. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.
434. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
435. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
436. 2 FARRAND, RECORDs, supra note 2, at 372-73 (Madison, Aug. 22).
437. Id.
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banned the trade, i.e., South Carolina and Georgia.438 Not a single state
voted to support him.439
V. Conclusion
Some historians have downplayed Dickinson's contributions to the
Constitution.440 This is an error. If James Madison was the "father of the
Constitution," then John Dickinson was at least a kindly uncle. In part,
this conclusion can be inferred from the results, which were much closer
to Dickinson's ideas than to Madison's. 44 More importantly, we have
explicit evidence that Dickinson played pivotal roles at numerous points
of constitutional decision making: choosing a method of electing
Senators, setting the formula for apportioning the Senate, establishing the
balance between state and federal powers, deciding to enumerate the
powers of Congress, 442 excluding judges from the executive veto,
443
creating independent federal courts below the Supreme Court, 4
protecting states from being forcibly combined with other states, 445 and
adding trust-style limitations on Congress's financial powers.44 6 One
historian whose assessment of Dickinson's contribution was closer to the
mark was Professor M. E. Bradford: "Possibly the most learned of the
Framers [he said of Dickinson], undoubtedly the most undervalued and
misunderstood of their notable company .... He is... definitive of the
moderate Federalist position of 1787-1788 and a key to the meaning of
what was achieved." 4 7 Professors Forrest and Ellen Shapiro McDonald
438. Id. at 416 (Madison, Aug. 25).
439. Id.
440. E.g., Powell, supra note 2, at 6 ("He was, therefore, a conspicuous figure in the
Convention of 1787, although for several reasons he did not have a large part in the final
result."); see Johannesen, supra note 2, at 170 (calling Dickinson's participation in the
convention "a singularly lack-luster performance"); see also CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787:
THE GRAND CoNvENTION 204 (1966) ("Dickinson, although an important figure in the
construction of the Great Compromise, behaved more and more like a sick old man,
which indeed he was."); see also id. at 250 (conceding that Dickinson was "very useful,"
but stating that he was "a victim of old age, poor health, and an unfortunate lack of
perspective, whose overall performance, despite flashes of brilliance, failed to match his
considerable reputation").
441. The findamental differences between Madison's vision of the Constitution and
the final results are outlined in MCDONALD, Novus, supra note 2, at 206-09.
442. See supra notes 339-41 and accompanying text.
443. Madison favored associating judges in the "revisionary" power. 1 FARRAND,
RECORDS, supra note 2, at 138-39 (Madison, June 6).
444. See supra Part IV.F.
445. See supra Part 1V.G.2.
446. See supra Part IV.G. 1.
447. BRADFORD, FATHERS, supra note 2, at 99, 103; see also BRADFORD, REASON,
supra note 2, at 79 ("Of all the men significantly involved in the major events leading up
to and following from the American Revolution none has been so undeservedly neglected
by our political historians as the mysterious John Dickinson.").
[Vol. 108:2
HeinOnline  -- 108 Penn St. L. Rev. 476 2003-2004
2003] THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF JOHN DICKINSON 477
agree that "the most underrated of all the Founders of this nation was
John Dickinson.,
448
Dickinson had reason to be pleased with the convention's work. He
believed that the new federal government would indeed "protect the
worthy against the licentious. ' 449  When, the following year, he
perceived that the ratification process might be slowing, he weighed in
with his first set of "Fabius" letters.
The "Fabius" letters were widely re-printed and well-received.45 °
By then, Dickinson was fifty-five years old-a relatively advanced age
for the time-and nearing the end of his political career. Yet in 1791 and
1792, he served as president of the Delaware constitutional convention,
which rewrote the state's original constitution. 51  Moreover, in
December, 1792, he again was elected to the Delaware legislature-
although he resigned after a few months.
Late in the 1790s, Dickinson became a supporter of revolutionary
France and an admirer of Tom Paine. Dickinson republished his first
"Fabius" letters, adding excerpts from Paine's Rights of Man in
footnotes. 452 In 1797, he published fifteen new "Fabius" letters, calling
on Americans to support the cause of France.453 However, his defense of
France was a defense of a republic besieged on all sides only after she
had rid herself of the agents of the Terror. For Dickinson openly and
profoundly regretted the execution of Louis XVI,454 and celebrated the
end of the Terror: "At length the reign of tyrants, or rather of monsters,
ended., 455
Dickinson had been born the same year as Washington. Unlike
Washington, though, he lived to enjoy a long and quiet retirement.
Dickinson closed his career principally as a gentleman farmer, his life
punctuated by occasional publications (including his collected Works)
and by correspondence with his old drafting and sparring partner,
Thomas Jefferson.
In February, 1808, near the end of Jefferson's time as President,
John Dickinson died at the age of 75.
On Dickinson's learning, see also Political Thought, supra note 2, at 3 n.2
(itemizing the range of references in Dickinson's works).
448. Forrest McDonald & Ellen Shapiro McDonald, John Dickinson: Founding
Father, 23 DEL. HIST. 24 (1988).
449. WOOD, supra note 2, at 475.
450. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 74-80 (editor's introduction).
451. FLOWER, supra note 2, at 254.
452. Id. at 252.
453. 2 WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 167-286.
454. Id. at 170.
455. Id. at 172.
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